



European Union
Election Observation Mission
Mozambique 2024
Final Report



General Elections

09 October 2024



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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.....	5
II.	INTRODUCTION	9
III.	POLITICAL CONTEXT	9
IV.	IMPLEMENTATION OF PREVIOUS EU EOM RECOMMENDATIONS	11
V.	LEGAL FRAMEWORK.....	11
VI.	ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATION.....	16
VII.	VOTER REGISTRATION	20
VIII.	REGISTRATION OF CANDIDATES	22
IX.	CAMPAIGN ENVIRONMENT	23
X.	MEDIA.....	25
XI.	SOCIAL MEDIA AND DIGITAL RIGHTS	29
XII.	PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN	33
XIII.	PARTICIPATION OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES	34
XIV.	CITIZEN AND INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVATION	34
XV.	ELECTORAL DISPUTES.....	36
XVI.	VOTING, COUNTING AND TABULATION OF RESULTS.....	40
XVII.	RESULTS AND POST-ELECTION ENVIRONMENT.....	47
XVIII.	RECOMMENDATIONS	54
	ANNEX 1 – Election Results	69
	ANNEX 2 – MEDIA MONITORING FINDINGS	76
	ANNEX 3 – SOCIAL MEDIA MONITORING FINDINGS.....	52

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACHPR	African Charter on Human and People's Rights
AMUSI	United Movement Action for the Integral Salvation
AR	National Assembly
AP	Provincial Assembly
AU	African Union
CAD	Democratic Centre for Democracy and Human Rights
CC	Constitutional Council
CDD	Centre for Democratic Development
CDE	District Election Commission
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CECSC	Civil Society Centre for Learning and Training
CIP	Centre for Public Integrity
CEMI	Electoral Consortium for <i>Mais Integridade</i>
CNE	National Election Commission
COG	Commonwealth Observation Group
CPLP	Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries
CRPD	Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
CSCS	Superior Council of Social Communication
CSO	Civil Society Organisations
EMB	Electoral Management Body
EU EOM	European Union Election Observation Mission
FAMOD	Forum of Mozambican Associations of People with Disabilities
FORCOM	National Forum of Community Radios
FRELIMO	Mozambican Liberation Front
GABINFO	Government Information Office
GC	General Comment
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICERD	International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
ISC	Social Communication Institute
IDEA	International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
INE	National Institute of Statistics
MDM	Democratic Movement of Mozambique
MISA	Media Institute of Southern Africa
ND	New Democracy
OJM	Mozambican Youth Organisation
PS	Polling Station
PAHUMO	Humanitarian Party of Mozambique
PODEMOS	Optimist Party for the Development of Mozambique
RENAMO	National Resistance of Mozambique
RM	Mozambique Radio
SADC	Southern African Development Community
STAE	Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration
TS	Supreme Court
TVM	Mozambique Television

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On 9 October, 17 million Mozambicans were called to vote in the seventh general election for the President and for the 250 seats of the National Parliament. Voters also elected ten Provincial Assemblies and ten Provincial Governors. The elections took place in a context of high levels of discontent, rising levels of poverty, a seven-year armed insurgency in the province of Cabo Delgado and profound mistrust in the election administration due to the perceived capture of public institutions by the Mozambican Liberation Front (FRELIMO), in power for the last 49 years. Election day was generally peaceful, but the counting and tabulation of results was marked by anomalies and serious flaws, and an acute lack of transparency, which negatively affected public confidence in the outcome of the process. Many of these shortcomings had already been identified by EU EOMs deployed in previous elections but had not been addressed. Although the provisional results first announced by the National Electoral Commission were significantly modified by the Constitutional Council, the final results still gave an overwhelming victory to the ruling party FRELIMO in the presidential, legislative and provincial elections. However, the results were widely contested by the main opposition parties and especially by candidate Venancio Mondlane. The protests that erupted the following months were violently repressed by security forces and left over 300 people dead.

Overall, the legal framework in Mozambique complies with the regional and international principles subscribed to by the country. Nonetheless, the electoral laws were subject to hasty review shortly before the election, lacked harmonisation, created legal uncertainty and did not take into consideration the 2019 EU EOM recommendations. Although some amendments aimed at enhancing transparency, others proved controversial, such as the removal of the competence of lower courts to annul an election, and the impossibility to purchase ballot boxes with a narrower slot before these elections took place. In addition to this, implementation of the electoral law was not always followed, such as the continued dismissal of election petitions by the courts for failure to comply with the principle of prior impugnation, a requirement that had been removed from the law.

The contest was pluralistic and generally calm during the electoral campaign, with a limited number of election-related incidents. EU observers and interlocutors reported an evident tilting of the playing field in favour of the ruling party and a blurred delineation between the party and state resources. FRELIMO benefited from the advantages of incumbency through the misuse of state resources and was able to strongly campaign in all provinces. Security forces did not overstep their functions, and no serious instance of inflammatory language was recorded.

Insufficient measures were introduced to ensure the quality and accuracy of the register, including an audit prior to the elections. This helped create a notable lack of confidence in the reliability of the electoral register, compounded by the fact that in several provinces it reflected a much higher number of voters than the overall voting age population derived from the national census projections. A total of 17,169,239 citizens were registered, an increase of 30 per cent compared to the 2019 elections, in a context where projections by the National Statistics Institute (INE) indicated an adult population growth of only 17 per cent for the same period. Young voters, age 35 or under, accounted for 58 per cent of the total, with 20 per cent being first-time voters.

The Constitutional Council (CC) approved four presidential candidates and rejected seven aspiring candidates for failing to meet the requirements. Overall, 35 political parties were approved by the CNE to contest the legislative elections and 16 political groups to run for the provincial elections.

Despite a compressed timeframe, budgetary constraints, serious logistical challenges, compounded by the insurgency in the province of Cabo Delgado, election preparations were completed in a timely manner. However, many interlocutors expressed a lack of confidence in the election administration's independence and technical capacity, questioning their ability to conduct a credible and transparent electoral process. In addition, the election commission was challenged by the late disbursement of the budget, and the lack of an adequate training and oversight of the work of some 190,000-polling staff. The CNE did not manage to effectively supervise the process, enforce the legal framework and guarantee the integrity of the poll. In addition, a lack of impartiality and trust in the National Electoral Commission (CNE) and the Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration (STAE), partly a result of the partisan nature of their respective composition - widely criticised by civil society organisations and opposition political parties - was observed at national, provincial and district levels.

While fundamental freedoms were generally respected during the campaign period, however the exercise of political rights of voters and contestants without fear of discrimination or repression was undermined during the election process. EU observers reported instances of political harassment, intimidation, and coercion by the ruling party in most provinces. In the post-electoral period, the rights to peaceful assembly, equal treatment, the security of the person and access to information were gravely disrespected with violent repression of opposition protests.

The effectiveness of campaign finance monitoring was undermined by lax enforcement and poor oversight. Campaign finance rules did not define ceilings on campaign spending and there is minimal oversight in relation to private funding and expenses, which could potentially enable illicit funding by the private sector. Despite the obligation for political parties to declare private contributions, authorities did not receive such declarations with any regularity.

Freedom of expression was generally respected during the election campaign period. However, news coverage, by both national radio and TV, were strongly biased in favour of FRELIMO, Daniel Chapo and the government narrative. The media sector in Mozambique lacks truly independent regulatory and licensing structures, creating safeguards against unwanted government interference, which together with legal provisions antagonistic to freedom of expression, restrict the work of journalists, create self-censorship and place the media in a position vulnerable to political influence.

The campaign in the social media had increasing outreach closer to election day. Presidential candidates Venancio Mondlane and Daniel Chapo dominated most of the online election-related activity. The tone used by the candidates in their respective platforms was generally moderate. Findings by the EU EOM social media monitoring unit revealed that Mondlane was the presidential candidate with the highest engagement on social networks. Disinformation was present in different platforms through fake news targeting mostly opposition candidates and the CNE. During the post-election period, social media became crucial for opposition parties and citizens to denounce electoral irregularities, while posts containing messages inciting to violence also circulated widely.

Turnout rates for the Presidential and the legislative elections were 42.16 and 43.2 per cent respectively, with significant variations between constituencies. Maputo Province and Maputo City showed the highest voter participation with some 64 and 63 per cent respectively, while the province of Nampula and Niassa the lowest, respectively with 28 and 32 per cent.

Although the EU EOM did not observe systematic flaws during the voting process, the subsequent counting phase lacked in transparency and insufficient safeguards to ensure the integrity of the

count. The tally process was cumbersome and inefficient, with EU observers reporting deliberate invalidation of opposition votes, instances of fraudulent alteration of polling results in favour of the ruling party, indications of ballot box stuffing, and cases of voters not found on the voter list of their polling station (PS).

Overall, the tabulation process was marked by a lack of transparency and inconsistency in the implementation of procedures. During district tabulation, the electoral administration could not ensure a uniform data entry process, allowing officials to enter results that did not match PS results, either deliberately or inadvertently. The EU EOM observed several instances of results manipulation conducted at district level, and in four locations, EU observers were asked to leave the tabulation centre on the second day of the process after noting discrepancies between the results from PS and the tabulated numbers. Significant discrepancies were identified in vote totals across the three elections in at least seven districts, with legislative election votes exceeding presidential election votes significantly, always in favour of the ruling party. The EU EOM was not given access to the disaggregated data used in the tabulation at the provincial and central levels. Despite several requests by the EOM, the electoral management body did not publish disaggregated results by polling station, which is not required by law, but would have helped to dissipate doubts about the outcome.

The provisional results published by the CNE on October 24 gave a landslide victory to the ruling FRELIMO party in the presidential, legislative and regional elections. Several opposition parties filed petitions with the Constitutional Council (CC) challenging the provisional results. Some 305 petitions for alleged irregularities and electoral crimes were filed with district courts on election day and during counting. An insignificant number of alleged irregularities were granted or partially granted redress, revealing a worrying situation concerning citizens' right to prompt legal redress. Many were dismissed for the lack of observance of the outdated principle of prior impugnation, and for lack of evidence. Some cases were appealed to the CC that proceeded to confirm most district court rulings while forwarding instances of criminal offences to the Public Prosecutor.

The CC acknowledged that the CNE did not conduct a thorough verification of the irregularities and proceeded to modify the CNE's provisional result without providing a sound legal basis for the changes made. It also acknowledged the irregularities that occurred during the electoral process, but stated that these were not large enough to influence the overall result of the election. The CC's lack of detailed explanation of the validation process negatively impacted on the predictability of the Council's decisions, and raised concerns regarding its ability to effectively adjudicate electoral disputes. Opposition parties and the Bar Association of Mozambique highlighted the CC's failure to provide a comprehensive explanation of the changes made, and the apparent illegality of the method used to ascertain the validity of the result sheets. The Bar Association recommended that either a recount be ordered or the election be annulled to restore electoral integrity. Opposition parties did not accept the official final results.

While the final results presented by the CC on December 23 significantly changed the provisional results announced by the CNE, they nevertheless confirmed FRELIMO's landslide victory in the presidential, legislative, and provincial elections. Daniel Chapo was declared president-elect with 65 per cent of the vote (compared to 70 per cent in provisional results) and independent presidential candidate Venâncio Mondlane came second with 24 per cent of the vote, compared to 20 per cent in provisional results. The Optimistic People for the Development of Mozambique (PODEMOS), a small extra-parliamentary party which supported Mondlane, came in second place, and overtook the Mozambican National Resistance's (RENAMO) to become the main opposition force. The 171

seats in the Parliament allocated to FRELIMO (24 seats fewer than attributed by the provisional results published by the CNE) represent more than two-thirds of the parliamentary seats. PODEMOS was allocated 43 seats, an increase of 12 seats compared to the provisional results, RENAMO received 28 seats instead of the provisional 20 seats, and the Mozambican Democratic Movement (MDM) received 8 seats, an increase from 4 provisional seats.

The post-electoral period was characterised by high levels of political violence. On 19 October, the legal advisor of presidential candidate Mondlane, Elvino Dias and the spokesperson of PODEMOS, Paulo Guambe, were assassinated in the centre of Maputo by unidentified armed men that - at the time of writing - have not yet been brought to justice. The periodic protests and strikes convened by Mondlane to protest against the provisional and final final results announced by the authorities, widely followed throughout the country, were violently repressed by security forces. On account of this climate of fear, Mondlane was forced to leave the country and only returned in January days before the inauguration of Daniel Chapo as President.

Priority Recommendations

The EU EOM has made 18 recommendations for improving the way elections are organised, managed, and conducted in Mozambique. They include eight priority recommendations:

Review the structure, composition and selection process of the election administration at all levels to enhance professionalism, integrity, accountability and impartiality throughout all stages of the electoral process. (Rec.2)

Review the results management system to ensure an efficient, uniform, consistent and transparent process, including: a quick system to announce provisional progressive results broken down by PS; and unambiguous procedures for rectifying errors and discrepancies in results protocols with clear criteria for the recount of ballots. (Rec.16)

The CNE, take full responsibility for the integrity of the electoral process, by adopting measures to address the consequences of electoral offences and malpractices during voting, counting and tabulation of results to diminish their impact of the election results. (Rec. 8)

State authorities to protect fundamental freedoms, namely the right to freedom of assembly, access to information, and the conduct of peaceful manifestation and campaign activities in a safe environment, free from intimidation and violent acts against party members, supporters and journalists. (Rec.7)

Establish and maintain reliable and cost-effective mechanisms to update the voter register, for example by using other existing and reliable data sources, such as a revised civil registry. (Rec.6)

The process by which the Constitutional Council validates results to be detailed and with specific references to the normative provisions and criteria used to ground the decision. (Rec. 18)

Review and harmonise electoral laws to grant legal certainty and remove contradictions. (Rec.1)

Strengthen the legal framework and oversight for campaign finance from private sources. Measures could include accountability mechanisms to reduce the opportunities for illicit financing, and reasonable campaign expenditure limitations to ensure equal opportunity and transparency. (Rec.10)

INTRODUCTION

The European Union (EU) deployed an Election Observation Mission (EOM) to observe the 9 October 2024 General and Provincial Assembly elections in Mozambique following an invitation from the Mozambican authorities. The EU EOM was present in Mozambique from 1 September to 5 November 2024.

The EU EOM was led by the Chief Observer, Laura Ballarín Cereza, Member of the European Parliament from Spain. The EU EOM comprised a core team of ten experts based in Maputo. A group of 32 long-term observers were deployed from 9 September to 18 October, and 76 short-term observers were deployed from 2 to 16 October to all regions of the country. The Province of Cabo Delgado, with the exception of its capital Pemba, could not be observed for security reasons.

For the election day, the EU EOM was reinforced with 45 locally recruited observers from diplomatic representations of EU Member States and the EU Delegation. In total, the EU EOM deployed 178 observers from 24 EU Member States, as well as from partner countries Canada, Norway and Switzerland. In addition, a delegation of seven Members of the European Parliament was led by Antonio López-Istúriz White, Member of the European Parliament from Spain.

The mission's mandate was to observe all aspects of the electoral process and assess the extent to which the elections complied with regional and international commitments for elections, as well as with national legislation. The EU EOM is independent in its findings and conclusions. The mission followed an established methodology and adhered to the "Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation", endorsed under United Nations auspices in October 2005 and now endorsed by over 50 organisations.

POLITICAL CONTEXT

Traditional parliamentary forces challenged by the dynamic political participation of the youth.

On 9 October, 17 million Mozambicans were called to vote in the seventh general election for the President and for the 250 seats of the National Parliament. Voters also elected for the fourth time ten Provincial Assemblies and for the second time ten Provincial Governors. Candidates contested a total of 1,128 elected positions.

Following controversial municipal elections in 2023, where widespread irregularities were denounced by national observers and the civil society, these elections took place in the context of high levels of discontent, an ongoing armed insurgency in the province of Cabo Delgado, and strong popular demands for transparent elections and the depoliticisation of the State and its institutions. Most interlocutors reported a profound mistrust in the election administration and in the Constitutional Council (CC), allegedly due to the capture of public institutions by the Mozambican Liberation Front (FRELIMO), in power for the last 49 years.

Four candidates contested the presidential elections. Daniel Chapo (47 years of age) was the youngest candidate, portrayed as a generational transition within the ruling FRELIMO party. The Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) backed Ossufo Momade, a second time presidential candidate who had been questioned as an opposition leader in recent years because of a perceived lack of willingness to challenge FRELIMO. Lutero Simango followed his late brother as the candidate of the Mozambican Democratic Movement (MDM) and sought to maintain MDM's parliamentary status. Following the broadly criticised¹ exclusion of the Democratic Alliance Coalition (CAD) by the CC, Venâncio Mondlane (a former RENAMO candidate for Maputo mayor) ran as an independent candidate with the formal support of the small extra-parliamentary party, the Optimist Party for the Development of Mozambique (PODEMOS), and aimed to mobilise disaffected young voters².

The contest was pluralistic and generally calm during the campaign period, with a limited number of election-related incidents like instances of obstruction of some opposition campaign activities. Yet, the exercise of political rights of voters and contestants were not fully respected. EU observers reported a climate of fear due to political harassment, intimidation and coercion by the ruling party in all provinces, except Zambezia, Niassa and Maputo City. Furthermore, fundamental freedoms of peaceful assembly were not respected in the post-electoral period. The general national strike and nationwide protests called by Mondlane resulted in violent repression of protests against the election results in all provinces³. According to the Centre for Democratic Development (CDD) as of early January, some 278 were killed in the protests.

Recommendation: State authorities to protect fundamental freedoms, namely the right to freedom of assembly, access to information, and the conduct of peaceful manifestation and campaign activities in a safe environment, free from intimidation and violent acts against party members, supporters and journalists.

¹ By a member of the National Election Commission, the Bar Association, *Centro Para Democracia e Direitos Humanos, Mais Integridade, Sala da Paz* and political parties.

² Mondlane was a member of MDM until 2018, and was excluded from RENAMO in 2024. Despite a serious lack of funds and inequitable access to the election and local administration by extra-parliamentary parties, the emergence of Mondlane and PODEMOS challenged the position of traditional opposition parties, RENAMO and MDM.

³ During the presence of the EU EOM in country, a national strike and street protests were called for 21, 24, 25 October and for the weeklong period from 31 October to 7 November.

IMPLEMENTATION OF PREVIOUS EU EOM RECOMMENDATIONS

Implementation of Previous EU EOM Recommendations⁴

Following the 2019 general elections, the EU EOM made 20 recommendations, including nine priority recommendations⁵. A few recommendations were addressed to the CNE, while the majority depended on the political initiative and will of the executive and legislative branches. Several of the priority recommendations focused on the strengthening and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, on the support to the accountability of national institutions, and on measures to increase the transparency of the election.

The majority of the EU EOM 2019 recommendations were not implemented, with only recommendation no.5 being partly implemented as some limited efforts were made at harmonising the electoral legislation. Recommendation no. 10, which called for the implementation of a more effective CNE public communication strategy was also only partly addressed.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Rushed legal amendments contributed to legal uncertainty of the incoherent and dispersed legal framework.

International Principles and Commitments

Mozambique has adopted the main international and regional legal instruments, including the principles for holding democratic and transparent elections. Mozambique's legal framework includes the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and its Optional Protocol, and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Article 18 of the Constitution stipulates those international conventions, once ratified, are automatically applied in Mozambique's legal order.

At the continental level, Mozambique is a member of the African Union (AU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and has signed and ratified the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, the Protocol to the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, the SADC Protocol on Gender and Development, the SADC Protocol against Corruption and the SADC Principles and Guidelines for Democratic Elections. Mozambique is a member of the Commonwealth since 1995 and a founding member of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries since 1996.

⁴ For further details on the implementation of the EU EOM 2019 recommendations see [EU EFM Final Report 2022](#)

⁵ Recommendations were addressed to the National Assembly, the Constitutional Council, political parties, the Superior Council of Social Communication, the Government, the Judiciary, the Public Prosecutor's Office and the Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration.

Constitutional Human Rights

The Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique (1990) defines the structure of the system of government, the rights and obligations of citizens, the legislative initiative, the powers of the president and other bodies and institutions, access to justice and the courts, and the election management bodies (EMB) and their responsibilities. The Constitution protects citizens without discrimination⁶, and grants equality to women and men, and recognises that persons with disabilities have the same rights and obligations. Acts of discrimination are punishable by law.

The Constitution offers protection of fundamental rights including freedoms of expression, press, assembly, demonstration, association, and the right to information. It also guarantees the right to individual freedom, security of the person and the right to judicial redress.

The most recent amendment to the Constitution, promulgated on 23 August 2023, revised Article 301(3), which states that the first district elections will be held as soon as the conditions are met. The Constitution incorporated the decision of the 2019 Peace Agreement to hold district elections in 2023. The decision to postpone the district elections was adopted by the AR with the votes of FRELIMO. The two opposition parties, RENAMO and MDM, voted against. The postponement sparked a debate in the opposition about the constitutionality of this change.

Electoral System

The Constitution enshrines a multi-party democracy based on periodic elections with clear division of power among the different branches of government. The Constitution allows for two consecutive presidential terms⁷.

The law provides for a two-round election system for the president. If no candidate obtains more than 50 per cent of the valid votes, a second round is to be held between the two candidates with the most votes, within 30 days of the CC declaring the results of the first round. The law does not set a deadline for the CC to declare the results⁸.

Of the total of 250 deputies, 248 members of the AR are elected according to a system of proportional representation applying the d'Hondt formula. There is no minimum threshold for representation. Two deputies, representing the diaspora constituencies of Mozambicans living in African countries and those living outside Africa, are elected by simple majority.

The constituency of the Provincial Assembly is the province. For the purpose of democratic representation, the law requires that 85 per cent of the seats are distributed proportionally among the districts, according to the number of registered voters, while 15 per cent of the seats are reserved for the provincial level for which the head of the list is running. The head of the list is the candidate for governor. The members of the Provincial Assembly (AP) are elected through a system of proportional representation while the governors are elected by simple majority.

⁶ All citizens are equal without distinction of colour, race, sex, ethnic origin, place of birth, religion, academic education, social standing, parent's marital status, profession or political option

⁷ A third term is possible but only five years after the completion of the previous term.

⁸ Despite the absence of an explicit legal provision regarding a deadline, specific articles in the Constitution compel the CC to proclaim results within a given timeframe

Electoral Legislation

The CC, in its ruling on the validity of the elections in 2019 considered the electoral framework to be based on *scattered pieces of legislation and made up of a multitude of electoral laws which, although they regulate different elections, contain broadly the same general principles and rules, ultimately affecting the unity and coherence of the electoral law system.*⁹ The EU EOM considers that this assessment remains valid, as only minor changes to the electoral framework have been introduced, which have not addressed the lack of coherence in the legislation. The 2024 amendments to the electoral law created legal uncertainty in the electoral process, particularly the provisions on the size of the ballot box slot, the changes to the jurisdiction of the district courts to annul elections, and the elimination of the requirement of a prior impugnation to file an electoral challenge. Uncertainty about the applicability of some legal provisions affected the confidence of stakeholders in the legality and predictability of decisions by the CNE and the courts¹⁰.

As in past elections, a legal review was introduced when the electoral process was already well advanced, with only 47 days to the polls¹¹. Changes to the electoral laws were passed unanimously in April 2024 with the President of the Republic returning the approved bill to parliament to define the jurisdiction of the district courts regarding electoral disputes. Once finally adopted, with the votes of FRELIMO and RENAMO, the two electoral laws introduced about 30 amendments. The adoption of the amendments so close to election day affected its socialization, introduced legal uncertainty and might point more to a political calculation rather than a genuine will to improve the electoral framework.

In the wake of the 2023 post-electoral dispute, the highest electoral judicial body with a political composition, the CC, reverted decisions taken by the first instance district courts on the annulment of elections on the grounds of their lack of competence. The review removed the district courts' first instance jurisdiction in regard to irregularities that could lead to an annulment of the vote by transferring these processes to the CC, while retaining competency to adjudicate on election complaints of a different nature. The largest domestic observer group *Mais Integridade* considered the removal of the district courts' jurisdiction to be a setback for the democratic process. Judges and lawyers' associations voiced their support to district judges who wished to continue to exercise their full jurisdiction.

The Mozambican Constitution does not guarantee a double appeal for all jurisdictional decisions. While some decisions of the district courts can be appealed to the CC, decisions to annul elections taken by the CC cannot be appealed. All CC decisions are final.

⁹ A Political Party law, a Voter Registration law, and the CNE law complement the legal framework. The 2019 EU EOM recommended the adoption of a harmonised Electoral Code in line with the Constitutional Council ruling.

¹⁰ Constitutional Council ruling 25/CC/2019 on the validation of the 2019 General Elections. The legal framework includes a dispersed set of laws for the election of the President, members of the AR, members of the AP and Provincial Governors, among others.

¹¹ A comprehensive study, partly funded by the European Union, of the election laws was produced in 2022 by International IDEA and the Institute for Multiparty Democracy, with wide consultation with political parties and academics. The study addressed several of the EU EOM 2019 recommendations. It was presented to the AR but not considered further.

The review further introduced the requirement for transparent ballot boxes with a narrower slot to insert ballot papers, without specifying the size of the slot. The new legal provision, suggested by the opposition, aimed at eliminating the wide-spread practice of ballot stuffing¹².

Answering an appeal by RENAMO, the CC rejected the purchase of new ballot boxes alleging that this provision would apply to future elections¹³.

The review removed a legal requirement demanding aggrieved parties to file a prior impugnation (*princípio da impugnação prévia*) at the PS or during tabulation as a pre-condition for an election appeal to be considered by the CC. Differing interpretation as to the validity of this requirement by the district courts resulted in contradictory decisions during the electoral process. Despite the legal review, the CC and the CNE considered the principle of prior impugnation to remain applicable which emphasised the lack of legal clarity and predictability of the complaint's procedures. In past elections, opposition parties complained that they were obstructed from presenting challenges at PS or during tabulation and, therefore, their petitions were rejected by the courts. The lack of legal clarity was further compounded by a mistake in the publication of the new elections laws which failed to mention the removal of this principle. A correction of the mistake, published in the Official Gazette on 13 September¹⁴, less than a month before election day, did not promote reassurance among the parties, and hindered stakeholders, especially political parties, from being adequately informed. There is a strong need for legal harmonisation in order to eliminate the procedures related to the principle of prior impugnation that, according to CC and CNE, still remain in the law.

Other amendments constituted in principle positive contributions to the transparency of the electoral process, including the definition of a one-hour rest period for election officials between the end of polling and the start of counting at PS, the uninterrupted nature of the counting process, and allowing observers and the media to attend the results tabulation process at all levels following a formal notification by the EMB's¹⁵.

Despite the legislative changes, several shortcomings in the legal framework remain¹⁶, including the lack of clarification of the subordinate hierarchy between the central and lower levels of electoral management, the absence of a transparency measure such as the publication by the CNE of results per PS, and the lack of harmonisation of the deadlines for decisions on appeals to the CC with the deadline for the CNE to announce the election results¹⁷.

¹² It was RENAMO's understanding that this legal requirement had to be applied to the 2024 election process, which would entail the purchase of new ballot boxes at a very late stage of the electoral process.

¹³ Constitutional Council ruling 11/CNE/2024 rejected the petition. See Election Disputes section for more detail.

¹⁴ Correction to Election Law 15/2024 published on 13 September 2024.

¹⁵ The amendment added several new cases for the annulment of elections at the PS. It included the annulment of all procedures taken by the PS if the replacement of a member of the PS is not recorded in the minutes, which contributes to the security of the electoral process. Some prison sentences for multiple electoral offences have been increased to make them more dissuasive.

¹⁶ In its validation of the 2023 Municipal elections results, the CC considered the legal framework to be imprecise and complex, citing as an example the CNE's lack of capacity to fully control the national tabulation.

¹⁷ During the 15 days within which the CNE must complete the tabulation and announce the national results, several petitions were still pending before the CC that could affect the results and were not considered. During the national tabulation, the legal representative of presidential candidate Mondlane mentioned that two petitions were pending before the District Courts of Maganja da Costa and Alto Molocué that needed to be decided before the CNE completed the national tabulation.

Recommendation: Review and harmonise electoral laws to grant legal certainty and remove contradictions.

ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATION

Lack of stakeholder confidence in the independence and transparency of the electoral administration.

Structure and Composition of the Election Administration

Elections are managed by the National Election Commission (CNE) supported by the Technical Secretariat for Election Administration (STAE). The CNE is constitutionally mandated to be an independent and impartial body responsible for supervising voter registration and electoral processes. The STAE handles the technical and administrative implementation of the voter registration and elections.

The current CNE comprises 17 members: five from FRELIMO, four from RENAMO, one from MDM, and seven from the civil society. After a selection process undertaken by the Parliament, criticised by civil society organisations for its lack of objectivity, the 17 members, including three women took office in January 2021¹⁸. Nine members, including its new Chairman, Anglican Bishop Carlos Matsinhe, representing the civil society, began their first term of office¹⁹. Over successive electoral cycles, the partisan structure of the CNE and STAE has become more entrenched, and doubts persisted on the impartiality of members of the civil society organisation quota²⁰.

The CNE and STAE structures comprise temporary bodies at provincial and district levels: the Provincial Election Commissions (CPE) and District/City Election Commissions (CDE/CEC), each with their associated local STAE²¹. The election management bodies at provincial level received identical resources irrespective of the size and population registered²². The CNE appointed a new STAE Director General in 2022, after the previous director stepped down having served during two election cycles.

Administration of the Election

Following the controversial 2023 municipal elections, political actors (except from FRELIMO) and civil society expressed lack of confidence in the impartiality and independence of the CNE

¹⁸ Policy brief N°12 (p.7-8), EISA-2021.

¹⁹ The two vice-presidents are appointed by FRELIMO and RENAMO, the two forces most represented in Parliament.

²⁰ Following disagreement in provinces and districts over which commissioners should be given which responsibilities within respective departments, in 2022, the CNE issued the deliberation n°19/CNE/2022 imposing corrections on attributions, competencies, organisation and functioning of CPE and CDE with members associated to FRELIMO, RENAMO, MDM and civil society representatives, given respectively the head of operations department, the head of the training and voter education department, the deputy-head of operations, and the head of administration and finance department, among others. This mechanism did not apply to the CNE, as the members agreed amongst themselves on their responsibilities within the thematic commissions.

²¹ The ten provincial bodies (plus the city of Maputo) were established in 2022 and district bodies followed in 2022 or 2023, depending on whether municipal elections were held.

²² Constituencies vary by a factor of about one to five between the city of Maputo and, Niassa being the less populated, and Nampula and Zambezia being the most populated.

and the STAE, and their ability to oversee and conduct of the electoral process independently and with transparency. Furthermore, parties expressed mistrust in other public institutions, including the CC, the apex of the judicial electoral system. The CNE president acknowledged external “interferences” in the process, while the CNE vice-president, affiliated with RENAMO, called the institution dysfunctional²³.

The EU EOM observed that CPEs and CDEs remained highly politicised, to the extent that the representatives of FRELIMO often kept information to themselves, regularly side-lining other members and depriving them of any decision-making power. At institutional level, the EU EOM also assessed that responsibilities between the CNE and STAE were frequently unclear, particularly concerning the tabulation process.

Recommendation: Review the structure, composition and selection process of the election administration at all levels to enhance professionalism, accountability and impartiality throughout all stages of the electoral process.

Overall, election preparations were completed on time, apart from some delays, including the start of voter registration postponed for a few weeks, and the disbursement of the first tranche of campaign funds to political parties²⁴. However, the amended electoral calendar was not published.

The CNE suffered from delays in the disbursement of the approved electoral budget. With a budget increase of around €270 million (or €16 per registered voter for three elections) and three months' salary arrears owed to electoral staff in the field, the impact on electoral preparations appeared to be limited²⁵.

Recommendation: Provide the CNE with budgetary independence through timely and adequate access to the funds approved in the National General Budget.

Overall, the CNE's public communication lacked strategic planning, coordination and effective outreach, which contributed to mistrust in the institution's work. Public information sharing consisted of irregular meetings with political parties, supplemented by rare press conferences or media interviews. The content and frequency of CNE updates did not meet public information needs²⁶.

Recommendation: CNE to establish an effective institutional communication strategy to enhance the transparency and accountability of the electoral process, develop measures to build public confidence and ensure the prompt publication of decisions and results.

²³ Respectively in an interview from Tanzania on 1 October and in a MBC TV programme on 26 October 2024. The CNE vice-president evoked a situation in which there is an appearance of unity or co-operation, but it deals with a disguised opposition or conflict situation, qualifying poorly the environment within the CNE, adding there was the presence of an “external hand”, in an interview on MBC TV, 26 September 2024.

²⁴ Deliberation N°1/CNE/2024 on 5 January 2024 on “Approval of the calendar for the seventh general presidential and legislative elections and the fourth for members of provincial assemblies in 2024”. The Prime Minister’s decree N°5/2024 on 30 January 2024 approved the postponement of the voter registration operations.

²⁵ There were isolated threats of strike action reported in the media. Hired staff who participated either in the voter registration process or the voter education campaign had still to be paid when elections took place.

²⁶ Most CNE/STAE 2024 decisions were not accessible from the CNE-STAE website. Training documents were not updated. From 13 to 29 September CNE internet website and Facebook account remained silent.

The late amendment introducing transparent ballot boxes with a slot that allows for the insertion of a single ballot paper per voter, just weeks before election day, posed operational challenges for the CNE and STAE, and was not adopted²⁷.

Procurement of ballot papers, results sheets, indelible ink and new ballot boxes was conducted in South Africa, under the supervision of elections officials²⁸. Electoral materials and voter lists (printed in the provinces) were delivered on time to the districts in the first week of October²⁹. Many remote parts of the country presented significant logistical challenges which were mostly overcome, with some districts using tents as PS³⁰. Many schools used as PS lacked electricity, requiring continued use of lamps provided in polling kits. Accessing election warehouses required the presence of representatives from the three political parties, each with one of the three key locks demonstrating the acute lack of trust between stakeholders³¹.

The electoral administration decided to print National Assembly ballot papers on both sides for the first time, yet information for stakeholders, including voters, was communicated only on polling day³². This arrangement offered unequal access to candidates in a process where parties represented in Parliament already held an advantage by being guaranteed a place at the top of the ballot paper³³.

Four of the seven polling staff positions were filled through a public examination, while the other members were nominated by the three political parties represented in the parliament. This process revealed several issues: potential electoral staff were inadequately informed about their contractual conditions, including transport and food allowances; at the time of application, there was no declaration to confirm that candidates were not affiliated with a political party; and polling station (PS) assignments were unclear.

The STAE cancelled the entire recruitment process of polling trainers in Quelimane district (Zambézia) after RENAMO submitted a complaint, claiming the lists included civil servants affiliated with FRELIMO³⁴. New staff had to be recruited on short notice from neighbouring districts. Similar cases of hiring politically oriented civil servants were reported by civil society in various districts, raising questions about the suitability of recruiting polling staff from the teaching profession and affecting the credibility of electoral bodies. The instruction issued by the STAE 48 hours before polling day, reminding all trainers that they were prohibited from serving as polling

²⁷ The CC rejected a challenge by RENAMO regarding the ballot box slot size, further eroding trust in the process. According to the STAE, approximately 64,000 transparent ballot boxes from previous polls have a standard size slot. An additional 14,775 new ballot boxes were procured and delivered before the amendment to the law.

²⁸ Resolution n°61/CNE/2024, 14 August 2024: “Models of the training and voting materials”.

²⁹ The CNE justified the secrecy surrounding the delivery date of the electoral kits on security grounds. Only the transport company and the police were aware of the itineraries, with each batch of electoral materials being equipped by GPS devices. Existing ballot boxes and polling booths had been deployed in September.

³⁰ Such as in the districts of Gorongosa (Sofala), Moatize and Mutarara (Tete) respectively with 45, 56, and 59.

³¹ Deliberation n°33/STAE/2024 on 26 September 2024.

³² Consequently, some voters discovered that certain lists appeared on either the front or back of the ballot papers depending on their constituency, with the ballot design lacking an order number per list. The 11 distinctive ballots across the 11 electoral constituencies featured unprecedented numbers of lists; between 25 and 35.

³³ By law, political parties represented in Parliament are secured to be on the top of each list in the Parliamentary and provincial elections, respectively MDM, FRELIMO and RENAMO for the 2024 elections.

³⁴ Memorandum n°59/GDC/STAE/2024 based on complaint by RENAMO and advocacy by national observers. Centre for Public Integrity (CIP), bulletins n°295-296. Some names of the polling staff removed from the district of Quelimane were seen in other districts as reported by the media, namely in Nicoadala and Gúruè districts.

staff, highlighted the lack of sound planning. Civil society reported approximately 30 cases of trainers who performed as polling staff on election day³⁵.

Based on 34 observed training sessions, according to EU observers, the training was generally satisfactory, although the component on vote counting was weaker, despite trainees being provided with sample materials. EU observers reported over 90 per cent attendance, with most participants appearing likely to be first-time polling staff. In total, nearly 190,000 PS staff were trained.

Recommendation: Enhance the integrity of the electoral process by selecting independent and impartial polling station members. Their roles should be protected from arbitrary assignments.

The training manual was finalised two weeks before electoral law amendments were published, leading to conflicting procedures issued by the election administration. The manual stated that after voting, electoral staff are entitled to rest for at least one hour before starting the count, rather than the maximum one hour stipulated by law³⁶. The manual also did not reference the CC 2023 municipal elections jurisprudence, which disallowed voters with cards but without their names on the voter list from voting.

Deficiencies noted in previous EU EOM reports, such as the stipulation of the serial number on the ballot paper, the public announcement of the ballot number during counting (raising concerns about the secrecy of the vote), and the provision limiting the validity of a ballot to an “X” sign or the voter’s fingerprint resulting in the potential invalidation of ballots that clearly indicate the voters’ intention still prevailed³⁷.

Also, the election administration did not disclose guidelines for the implementation of the results management phase, raising concern before the elections about the robustness of the centralisation and tabulation software and the transparency of the process³⁸. At local and central level, the EU EOM was not allowed to observe the IT software used in this phase of the process³⁹.

Voter Education

The voter education campaign involved the deployment of 6,000 officers across all districts four weeks before the start of the election campaign. Election officials acknowledged that there was a lack of oversight to measure the impact of voter education activities in the field. Voter information messages were aired on Radio Mozambique and various radio programmes were reproduced in local languages through provincial and community radio stations. Additionally, TV spots were also aired on public television nine days before the vote. Youth organisations and some election

³⁵ CIP bulletin N°314 – 18 October 2024.

³⁶ It explained that the counting process should not be interrupted once started.

³⁷ CC’s agreement n°48/2023 in response to deliberation n°66/CNE/2024 of 9 October 2023.

³⁸ A CNE vice-president publicly criticised the limited two hours training sessions for the tabulation process and blamed some of his colleagues for not traveling to the districts to ensure this training took place (Zambezia and Nampula provinces). Training sessions were conducted between the 14 - 22 September by the CNE/STAE as per resolutions N°74/CNE/2024 and N°75/CNE/2024 of 12 September. Deliberation N°94/CNE/2024 on centralisation and tabulation of electoral results issued on 3 September gathered essential aspects from the electoral laws without offering guidelines for its implementation.

³⁹ In September, the STAE selected an IT consultant to update the results centralisation software, which had been introduced in 2023 for local elections. Resolution N°41/CNE/2024 on 16 September: “Centralisation and tabulation software for 2023/24 elections”.

officials expressed regret that the CNE /STAE campaign was not adapted for digital platforms and social media.

VOTER REGISTRATION

Lack of confidence in the reliability of the voter register.

The Right to Vote

The right to vote is extended to all Mozambican citizens of sound mind who are at least 18 years of age and enrolled in the voter register. In the absence of documentation, two witnesses can be called upon to vouch for a registrant's identity. Although prisoners are eligible to vote and to stand as candidates, voter registration is not conducted in state penitentiaries, posing an ongoing restriction on political rights.

Voter Registration Procedures

According to Mozambican law, a new voter registry is produced for each election. For the 9 October general elections, the STAE combined both the voter registration exercise conducted in 2023 ahead of the municipal elections⁴⁰ with the voter registration conducted in 2024⁴¹. The election administration relied on district level population projections from the National Statistics Institute (INE)'s based on the 2017 census, as official target registration figures.

There was a notable lack of confidence in the reliability of the electoral register, given the discrepancies between the population projections of the INE and the electoral register. In several provinces, the electoral register reflected a higher number of voters than the total population of voting age derived from the census⁴².

A total of 17,169,239 citizens were registered, including 333,839 in the diaspora, representing an increase of 30 per cent compared to 2019 elections, in a context where INE's projections forecasted only a 17 per cent growth in the adult population. Women accounted for 52 per cent of registrants, while first-time voters and citizens aged 18 to 35 comprised respectively 20.5 and 58 per cent of registrants⁴³. Internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Cabo Delgado province could register at their current place of residence using the identification procedure in the absence of identity documents, which proved particularly useful.

Although the two registers use different methodologies to compile figures, confidence in the electoral register was undermined by discrepancies between the INE's population projections and the electoral register. Overall, the registration rate in-country was 103 per cent compared to projected population figures⁴⁴. It also reflected significant variation among provinces, ranging

⁴⁰ The equivalent of 53.8 per cent of the eligible population was registered in 2023.

⁴¹ Voter registration is active and compulsory, and was scheduled from 15 March to 28 April; registration was delayed and extended to 15 May in Cabo Delgado's Quissanga district due to security concerns

⁴² The 2019 EU EOM already raised these concerns.

⁴³ Based on data provided by the INE for age distribution.

⁴⁴ If the CNE had considered the INE estimates for 9 October rather than 1 July 2024, the voter registration turnout estimate nation-wide could have been one percent lower, 102.82 percent instead of 103.81 percent. In the districts of Chokwe (Gaza province, which had the highest turnout countrywide), of Ibo (Cabo Delgado) and in Moatize (Tete),

from 86.21 per cent in Niassa to 150.01 per cent in Gaza⁴⁵. According to the CNE, these figures represented approximately 650,000 more registered voters than would have been expected based on the INE projections, and this in case all eligible citizens had registered. This high level of participation and significant discrepancies between provinces and districts raised serious concerns among stakeholders about registry accuracy and the quality of the process.

Recommendation: Establish and maintain a reliable and cost-effective mechanism to update the voter register, for example, by using other existing and reliable data sources such as the civil registry.

The EU EOM echoed these concerns, previously raised by the EU mission in 2019. According to the STAE, access to the registration process, combined with the new plastic voter card, justified the high turnout though STAE acknowledged that a more thorough study was necessary to determine this claim. It remained unclear whether the STAE considered information provided by civil registry, and information on interdicts, convicts, and on inpatients in psychiatric establishments⁴⁶. Transparency concerns also arose from the lack of public information on the number of duplicate registrations and registry cleaning procedures.

According to the International Organisation for Migration's report, nearly 260,000 IDPs in Cabo Delgado province were potentially eligible to register outside their place of residence (73 per cent are displaced outside of their district of origin)⁴⁷. Additionally, an estimated 13,500 eligible voters were forced to leave the province for security reasons, effectively disenfranchising them.

The Electoral Consortium *Mais Integridade* (CEMI) observed recurring issues in the 2023 and 2024 processes including: favouritism towards FRELIMO members or supporters in registration access, unequal distribution of registration teams favouring FRELIMO strongholds, cases of denied access to observers, allegations of underage registration, difficulties in using registration kits, and logistical shortcomings⁴⁸.

Weeks before the elections, EU observers reported allegations from opposition parties and/or local interlocutor, including domestic observers, regarding the collection of voter cards in different districts. EU observers directly witnessed public office employees recording voter cards' details, with numerous cards visibly collected⁴⁹.

Recommendation: The law should provide for the conduct of an independent audit of provisional voter registration data before finalising the voter register.

The CNE published seat allocations for the National Parliament and Provincial Assemblies, based on the voter register and with a minimum of 80 representatives for the first 800,000 registered

respective Provincial Election Commissions informed the EU EOM that the registration turnout reached respectively 174, 204 and 215 per cent. The CNE did not publish such figures for any of the 161 districts.

⁴⁵ A registration rate above 100 per cent in Gaza province led the director of INE at that time (2019) to doubt the registration figures which should not be reached before 2040.

⁴⁶ Articles 29, 30 and 31 of the amended voter registration law n°2/2024, 25 January 2024.

⁴⁷ Considering that the population of voting age represents 48 per cent of the total internally displaced population, [IOM report](#), July 2024, in a context where displaced persons in the province of Cabo Delgado represent nearly three quarters of those in the country and 94 per cent of those in the three northernmost provinces of the country. The population of registered voters in the Cabo Delgado was 1,407,467.

⁴⁸ [Report](#) on the observation of voter registration, *Mais Integridade*.

⁴⁹ EU observers received various reports of alleged FRELIMO members soliciting voter cards in exchange for money or food by visiting citizens' homes which, in effect, prevented those persons from voting, a practise allegedly targeting known opposition supporters.

voters plus one additional seat for every additional 100,000 registered voters. Voters were assigned to 26,337 PS in-country and abroad, following the limit of 800 voters per station⁵⁰. Political parties received a copy of the voter register 45 days before election day, as required by law⁵¹.

REGISTRATION OF CANDIDATES

The lack of transparency affected the legal certainty, credibility and fairness of the process.

Registration of Candidates

The eligibility requirements to contest the presidential, legislative, and provincial elections protect the right to stand and are in line with international and regional commitments ratified by the country. The registration process of presidential candidates falls under the responsibility of the CC. There are no discriminatory or unreasonable requirements to compete for presidential elections. The CC approved four candidates and rejected seven aspirants for failing to meet the legal requirements. According to the CC's decision, two candidates were rejected for failing to submit the minimum of 10,000 supporting signatures of eligible voters. Five candidates were rejected on the basis of evidence of various irregularities relating to the authenticity of signatures of supporting voters and the corresponding voter register, missing signatures, incomplete voter information, lack of notarisation and candidate application forms with evidence of signature by the same person⁵².

The CNE is responsible for the approval of candidates to the National and Provincial Assemblies. Overall, 35 political parties were approved to contest the legislative elections and 16 political groups to run for the provincial elections. All political forces were entitled to receive public campaign funds. The controversial candidate registration process that excluded the candidacy of the Democratic Alliance Coalition (CAD) but added candidacies to the provincial race after the start of the election campaign lacked legal certainty and transparency to voters and contestants, with significant implications on the credibility and fairness of the process⁵³. The CAD's rejection by the CNE was based on administrative grounds. Although the Coalition appealed to the CC, the latter declared null and void the CNE registration. The CAD argued that the rejection of its candidacy was politically motivated, as it closely followed the announcement of the CAD's support to Mondlane's presidential candidacy on 6 June and aimed to leave Mondlane without a political platform in the legislative race. The Coalition claimed that the CC overlooked the corrections made to its registration process, which were finalised with delay.

⁵⁰ Seats allocations per electoral constituency, respectively for the National Assembly and for the Provincial Assemblies: Niassa (13/80), Cabo Delgado (21/85), Nampula (48/103), Zambezia (42/99), Tete (23/85), Manica (16/82), Sofala (19/83), Inhambane (15/81), Gaza (18/82), Maputo (23/86) and City of Maputo (10/NA).

⁵¹ Voter registration law N°22/2024 harmonised the 45-day deadline before the elections for publishing the final version of the voter register with the same deadline in place since 2019 for sharing the register with political parties.

⁵² Constitutional Council Decision 6/CC/2024, 24 June. Rejected candidates included Domingos J.Zucula and Feliciano M. Machava for failing to submit the minimum of 10,000 signatures; Dorinda C. Eduardo, Manuel C.D.S.P.Junior, Mário Albino, Miquel R.S.Mabote and Rafael F.Bata for evidence of irregularities.

⁵³ The CNE accepted the registration of the CAD and ACRIAJUDA (Association for the Development of Children and Youth in the Community) on 9 May but rejected both lists in its resolution 82/CNE/2024. Regarding the provincial elections, ACRIAJUDA filed a complaint to challenge its exclusion. Contrary to the law, the CNE did not take a decision on the complaint but apparently established personal contacts with the association to remedy the situation. In the publication of the 17 July CNE resolution, after the start of the campaign, ACRIAJUDA was added to the final list of candidates for the provincial elections. This CNE decision lacked a transparent process.

Despite the CNE's legal obligation to verify the CAD's registration requirements before its approval on 9 May, it appears to have failed to do so. The CNE only verified the registration requirements when former coalition members protested the registration of the CAD. The Bar Association criticised the incongruous decision taken by the CC and considered that the CC lacked competence to decide on this matter. In the end, the exclusion of the CAD, a coalition supporting presidential candidate Venâncio Mondlane, did not seem to have a major impact, as the PODEMOS party took over Mondlane's support.

CAMPAIGN ENVIRONMENT

A campaign without major incidents, yet with evident misuse of state resources in favour of the ruling party resulting in a tilted playing field.

Election Campaign

The 43 days campaign was competitive and calm with a limited number of election-related incidents reported by the observers. Fundamental freedoms were generally respected, apart from few instances of occupation of previously notified venues or the obstruction of the opposition's campaign⁵⁴. Transportation of supporters to campaign events of the ruling party resulted in traffic accidents with three victims. The EU EOM observed 111 campaign events over 24 days in all provinces. Based on these observations, the ruling party was present across all provinces. Although 38 political forces contested the elections, only 14 organisations were noted by the EU observers to have a minimum of visibility in the field⁵⁵.

EU observers and interlocutors reported an evident tilting of the playing field in favour of the ruling party. FRELIMO benefited from the advantages of incumbency through the misuse of state resources, registered at half of the FRELIMO rallies observed. EU observers noted instances of use of state vehicles and the summoning of civil servants and teachers to participate in FRELIMO's campaign activities in all provinces, except Maputo City, Gaza, and Manica.

Among other parties, MDM was observed once by the EU EOM to benefit from the use of state resources. *Mais Integridade* reported such cases occasionally also by RENAMO. The misuse of state resources is an electoral offence, and once reported, must be investigated by the public prosecutor's office. Most complaints about the breach of the legal framework for campaigning were filed by political parties in relation to the destruction of campaign materials. The most notable complaint referred to the arson attack on 23 September, in Mabote (Inhambane) against the truck of PODEMOS carrying a sound equipment and campaign material⁵⁶.

Recommendations: Enforce the existing prohibition on the misuse of state resources.

At the campaign events observed, security forces did not overstep their functions and no serious instance of inflammatory language was recorded. The promises made by all the candidates evolved

⁵⁴ Reported in all provinces except for Maputo Province.

⁵⁵ FRELIMO, RENAMO, MDM, PODEMOS, *Nova Democracia*, *Partido para o Desenvolvimento de Moçambique*, *Partido Acção de Desenvolvimento Unido para Salvação Integral*, *Partido Humanitário de Moçambique*, *Associação para o Desenvolvimento da Criança e Jovens na Comunidade*, *Associação dos Deficientes Moçambicanos*, *Partido para a Paz, Democracia e Desenvolvimento*, *Revolução Democrática*, *Partido de Justiça Democrática de Moçambique* and the presidential candidate Mondlane.

⁵⁶ Reports of civil society platforms *Mais Integridade*, *Sala da Paz* and DECIDE confirmed these observations.

around the priorities of youth employment, fighting corruption, building roads, improving education and health services, access to water, and investing in agriculture. Observers noted an effort to adapt the messages to the districts visited, and the tone of the campaign remained joyful. Besides traditional door-to-door campaigning and caravans, the three parliamentary parties favoured rallies, while Mondlane gave priority to marches. At the campaign events observed by the EU EOM, Mondlane and PODEMOS attracted the most youth, FRELIMO mobilised the most women participants and speakers, while MDM had the most campaign messages addressed specifically to women.

Community and religious leaders from different congregations attended campaign events, often participating actively, especially at FRELIMO campaigns. Interlocutors reported cases of political pressure to use churches as a venue for campaigning in the provinces of Maputo, Inhambane, Sofala, Zambézia and Nampula.

Campaign Finance

Registered political forces benefited from public and private funding for their election campaigns⁵⁷. The law is relatively permissive regarding the sources of campaign funding and does not define ceilings on campaign spending. Public funding of MZN 260 million (EUR 3.7 million) for campaigning was allocated by the CNE for the three elections⁵⁸. The ability of smaller parties to conduct a nationwide campaign from the start was hampered by the lack of financial resources and the three to four weeks delay for the release of public funds by the CNE⁵⁹.

The electoral law imposes specific requirements related to transparency and accountability of public funding for campaigning. Political parties have to report to the CNE their campaign expenses and revenues in relation to public funding up to 60 days after the proclamation of official election results⁶⁰. In the past, disclosure and reporting requirements were not always respected, and oversight mechanisms and sanctions were not enforced⁶¹.

Sources of private funding may include contributions from candidates, national citizens, international or national affiliated political parties or from international or national non-governmental organisations. Contributions from international governments, governmental organisations, national or international public institutions or companies are prohibited⁶². There is traditionally little oversight in relation to private funding and expenses incurred during

⁵⁷ Public funds are allocated on the basis of the candidacies submitted. This results in some parties with seemingly no political activity or party structure to be visible only around election time to be able to collect funding.

⁵⁸ A third to the four presidential candidates in equal portions; a third to parliamentary candidates, and the same amount to candidates for provincial assemblies.

⁵⁹ Most parties submitted proof of expenditures to the CNE to receive the remaining two tranches of 25 per cent.

⁶⁰ The CNE then has 60 days to analyse these accounting reports and to publish its conclusions in the Official Gazette.

⁶¹ No action was taken against parties that failed to account for their campaign spending. The CNE has not published its conclusions on campaign spending in the past, as required by the law.

⁶² Political parties disclosed that, in addition to public funding, they raised financial resources for election campaigning through membership fees.

campaigning, which may potentially enable illicit funding by private enterprises and by organised crime networks according to interlocutors⁶³.

Recommendation: Strengthen the legal framework and oversight for campaign finance from private sources. Measures could include accountability mechanisms to reduce the opportunities for illicit financing, and reasonable campaign expenditure limitations to ensure equal opportunity and transparency.

MEDIA

The public media was prolific, yet provided unbalanced coverage in favour of the ruling party.

Media Environment

The media landscape in Mozambique is vast and pluralistic⁶⁴, however, according to journalists and the International Press Institute, there are concerns about the steady erosion of press freedom, and shrinking space for independent journalism.

Radio, which has not been digitised, remains the most accessible source of information, while television, whose digital switchover process was completed in 2021, has emerged as an important medium for parties to publicise their programmes. The state monopoly on broadcasting ended in 1992, with the creation of legal and technical conditions for private sector access to the frequency spectrum. In 1994, *Rádio Moçambique* (RM) was established as the provider of the public broadcasting service, which provides continuous broadcasting, on demand programming and podcasts on its website. The public television service was granted to *Televisão de Moçambique* (TVM), which also has online dissemination and provides content on demand.

There are some 20 licensed television channels. This is the result of the digital switchover process having widened the market, since operators can broadcast their content through the Transport, Multiplexing and Transmission Company (TMT)⁶⁵.

Some of these television operators also broadcast continuous content online, as well as providing up-to-date information. This is the case of STV Play of the SOICO Group, the largest private media group, which, in addition to linking to SFM radio online, or STV *Notícias* (the news-themed channel of the group) opened an information programme covering the General Elections with updated information content.

⁶³ Although the law requires political parties to declare the private contributions received, competent authorities do not receive such declarations on a regular basis.

⁶⁴ International Press Institute Mission Report 2022, Press Freedom in Mozambique. Findings include the legal and regulatory uncertainty, with strong governmental influence and control over the media landscape and work of the press.” *In practise the country’s media are subject to strong informal controls by the country’s ruling party, Frelimo, which exerts power over the media through different bodies...*”

⁶⁵ TMT is responsible for digital migration. The transparency of the deal raises doubts and presents problems of vertical concentration of the media, as TVM and RM are also shareholders in TMT.

Together with RM, which has a national reach and broadcasts in Portuguese and 19 national languages, more than 100 private and community radio stations operate throughout the country⁶⁶. There is a diversity of newspapers, both printed and online. The circulation and influence of printed newspapers remains confined to urban areas⁶⁷.

Legal Framework

The Constitution and Law 18/91 on the press provide for freedom of expression, freedom of the press and the right to information, as well as the independence and impartiality of the public media. The Law n°. 34/2014⁶⁸ protecting the right of access to information, established easier access to information strengthening transparency and accountability. However, restrictions on access to information and press freedom can still be found in parts of the legislation such as Law 12/1979 establishing a regime for the protection of State Secrecy, Press Law 18/9169, which includes provisions on the abuse of press freedom and defamation, and Council of Ministers Decree 40/2018.

Recommendation: Eliminate provisions limiting freedom of expression and the press, in particular abolishing decriminalisation of defamation

A long-standing debate about reforming media legislation, but also about creating better regulatory structures, has resulted in a number of bills being submitted to Parliament since 2021 that have never made it to plenary⁷⁰. According to EU EOM's interlocutors, the media sector lacks truly independent regulatory and licensing structures to create safeguards against unwanted government intervention, which, together with legal provisions limiting freedom of expression, have the potential to restrict the work of journalists, encourage self-censorship and place the media in a position vulnerable to political influence.

The Superior Council of Social Communication (CSCS) is entrusted by the Constitution and the Press Law with the duty of guaranteeing the independence of the media. Although the CSCS features quite prominently in the Constitution and the Press Law, the CSCS is not, in fact, a regulator of the media, beyond the general question of media ethics. The CSCS does not engage in regulatory activities such as issuing licences and determining local content requirements. Those critical functions are carried out by the Government Information Bureau (GABINFO), under the Prime Minister's Office, which is the entity that licenses and produces the credentials for the media.

⁶⁶ Of the community radios, 85 belong to the state under the supervision of the Institute of Social Communication (ICS) and 60 are operated by civil society and religious organisations under the National Forum of Community Radios (FORCOM). The former focused on civic education programmes, while the radios operated under FORCOM covered the electoral campaign.

⁶⁷ Among them, the most widely circulated are the daily *Notícias*, which together with two other weeklies, *Domingo* and *Desafio*, are part of *Sociedade de Notícias S.A.*, whose main shareholder is the state (99 per cent). The state also owns the *Agência de Informação de Moçambique* and the *Empresa de Transporte, Multiplexação e Transmissão*, responsible for digital migration and content distribution platform (TMT).

⁶⁸ Law on the Right to Information. 34/2014, 31 December.

⁶⁹ The press law (Article 47, paragraph 4) denies journalists immunity from criminal liability for defamation when the offended party is the President, even if there is evidence supporting the alleged facts.

⁷⁰ Draft Media Law and the Draft Broadcasting Law.

Recommendation: Ensure the independence of the Superior Council of Social Communication with the legal status of an independent administrative entity, and protected from government interference.

GABINFO is the body that oversees the public media, TVM and RM, as well as a network of community radio stations through the Social Communication Institute (ICS). It is also responsible for proposing legislation related to the communications sector. The structure that licenses media and supervises public media suffers from a lack of independence - it is under the direct control of the government - and is therefore exposed to political interference, contrary to international standards for the independence of media regulatory bodies⁷¹.

The provisions of the Press Law relating to the regulation of the broadcasting sector are not in line with good international practice. The law does not specify who is responsible for regulating broadcasting as a whole. Instead, these critical issues are dealt with through decrees. The inclusion of these issues in regulations, rather than in legislation, undermines the importance of Mozambique's regulatory framework.

Article 12.^o of the Press Law states that '*During election periods, competing parties have the right to regular and equitable airtime on national radio and television broadcasting, under the terms established by the Electoral Law*'. Free airtime allocated to candidates on *Radio Mozambique* and TVM is guaranteed by the Constitution, the Press Law and the Election Laws, and is regulated by the CNE. The Election Law 8/2013 also specifically protects the media's rights to freedom of expression during election periods and authorises political parties and presidential candidates to make use of the state broadcaster to publicise their election campaigns.

In addition to these, there are other provisions in the Penal Code relating to defamation against the President of the Republic and public figures that contain disproportionate sanctions and are not in line with international practices protecting freedom of expression⁷².

The Press Law states that state broadcasters fulfil their functions without external interference or influence that could compromise their ability to perform their duties. However, this seems unlikely, since directors of public service broadcasting are appointed by the government⁷³.

Monitoring Election Coverage by the Media

Freedom of expression was generally respected during the campaign period. The recent amendment to the Electoral Law, which permits observers and the media to attend the tabulation of results, enabled journalists to attend without any reported incidents⁷⁴.

⁷¹ Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa, Article VII, 1.

⁷² ICCPR, United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34 to article 19, paragraph 47: '... States should consider decriminalising defamation and, in any case, the application of criminal law should be considered only in the most serious cases and imprisonment is never an appropriate penalty.'

⁷³ Also, the duties imposed on journalists in the Press Law, Article 5 are unusual; it is not common for a law to stipulate that journalists perform their duties on the basis of criteria such as national foreign policy and national defence imperatives. Presidential Decree 4/95 also requires daily print media to publish government news published by GABINFO, free of charge to the government and the government source must be cited.

⁷⁴ According to FORCOM, MISA Mozambique and the CIP.

A large number of public and private broadcast and print media covered the electoral process. During the campaign, several media organisations reported the practice of allocating a reporter exclusively to accompany presidential candidate Daniel Chapo's motorcade around the country, alleging 'cost sharing' and no compromise to their 'editorial independence'. This is a common practice that only benefits those candidates who have the resources to pay for it with a clear detriment to political pluralism.

The EU EOM carried out media monitoring between 10 September and 6 October ⁷⁵. According to EU EOM findings, the public broadcaster TVM and *Rádio Moçambique* provided free airtime for the contestants, in accordance with CNE regulations ("*Tempo de Antena*"). The public media TVM and *Rádio Moçambique* offered citizens daily reports on the campaign activities of the different candidates. However, no opinion or debate programmes were broadcast, limiting the information on offer to voters and their ability to make an informed choice.

News coverage by both state radio and TV were biased in favour of FRELIMO and Daniel Chapo. In both cases, FRELIMO received the largest share of airtime (26 per cent and 44 per cent respectively), often in a non-critical tone, followed in the case of television by RENAMO (18 per cent) and MDM (16 per cent). The President of the Republic and the Government together had more representation than any of the other parties in the electoral contest. The tone was positive in 53 per cent of the cases for the President and in 40 per cent for the Government (*see Annex 2*).

Radio Mozambique showed the same trend. The President came just behind FRELIMO with 19 per cent of airtime, more than RENAMO, MDM and PODEMOS, and the government obtained the same representation as all the other parties in the contest combined (5 per cent). The tone, which was markedly neutral when referring to the various parties, was remarkably positive for the President (100 per cent) and the Government (89 per cent) (*see Annex 2*). Women's participation in politics received little media coverage.

The private television channels Soico *Televisão* (STV), TV *Miramar* and TV *Sucesso* also offered unbalanced coverage in favour of the ruling party and its presidential candidate Daniel Chapo. STV gave FRELIMO and President Nyusi the largest share of time in news coverage (29 and 17 per cent respectively), RENAMO with the same percentage of time allocated to the government (14 per cent), followed by MDM (15 per cent) and PODEMOS (11 per cent).

The TV channel TV *Miramar* allocated 35 per cent to FRELIMO, 18 per cent to President Nyusi, 14 per cent to the Government, 13 per cent to RENAMO, and 10 per cent to PODEMOS. MDM was allocated 8 per cent of news coverage time, with the remaining groups receiving minimal representation. TV *Sucesso* allocated 38 per cent of airtime to FRELIMO, 17 per cent to President Nyusi, 17 per cent to PODEMOS, 16 per cent to RENAMO, and 6 per cent to ND.

⁷⁵ The sample monitored included four television channels (the public TVM and the private STV, *Miramar* TV and *Sucesso* TV); one radio station (the state-owned *Rádio Moçambique Antena Nacional* - RM); three newspapers (daily *Notícias* (public), and the private *Savana* and *Diário de Moçambique*) and four weekly newspapers (*Domingo*, *Savana*, *Zambeze* and *Magazine Independente*). The television channels were monitored from 18:00h to 00:00h, while *Radio Mozambique* was monitored daily from 06:00h to 10:00h, coinciding with news programmes, the '*Rescaldo da Campanha*' programme, '*Agenda da Campanha Eleitoral*' and '*Jornal da Manhã*'.

The daily newspaper *Notícias*, allocated its largest share of news content to FRELIMO (36 per cent) followed by President Filipe Nyusi (15 per cent), RENAMO (13 per cent), MDM (11 per cent) and PODEMOS (9 per cent) and government activities with 9 per cent. All newspapers monitored showed the same trend with the exception of *Canal de Moçambique*, which allocated only 10 per cent of its news coverage to FRELIMO, while reserving 46 per cent and 38 per cent, respectively, to the Government and President Nyusi, with minimal coverage for the other parties in the election race (*see Annex 2*). The number of editorial pieces was small in all publications and the tone was similar to that found in the news pieces.

FRELIMO purchased substantial amounts of advertising space on all channels, both public and private, and was the only political force with such presence across all of them. Electoral legislation is silent on paid political advertising during the campaign period. The disparity in financial resources created an unequal playing field among competitors.

The debates organised with candidates for the legislative and provincial elections from various parties provided an opportunity for additional visibility for the opposition and lesser-known candidates and were exclusively aired by TV *Sucesso*.

Post-election media environment

The post-election environment was characterised by great social tension, marked by the self-proclamation of Mondlane as President, the murders of Venâncio Mondlane's lawyer, Elvino Dias and PODEMOS representative, Paulo Guambe, systematic accusations of electoral fraud and the calling of protests that were violently repressed by the security forces. In this context, several incidents involving journalists took place notably the one on 21 October, when a group of journalists were attacked by the police with tear gas while interviewing Mondlane in a public square in the capital⁷⁶.

SOCIAL MEDIA AND DIGITAL RIGHTS

Fact-checking groups detected fake news and disinformation, with a social media campaign with limited outreach.

The use of Internet and social media in Mozambique is limited. The most recent studies on the subject, dated January 2024, set the Internet penetration rate in the country at 23 per cent, meaning that 26.41 million people in Mozambique remain offline⁷⁷. Despite this, social media has been vital for the visibility of opposition actors among citizens with limited access to traditional media.

Facebook is the most used social network in Mozambique (3.2 million users), followed by TikTok (1.46 million users), LinkedIn (610,000 users), Instagram (595,400 users) and X (68,700 users) (*see charts 1 and 2 in Annex 3*). In addition, many national and local media have a digital version

⁷⁶ The attack was promptly condemned in a statement by the CSCS, MISA Mozambique and Deutsche Welle, which had journalists on the scene. Neither the state television, nor the newspapers whose main shareholder is the state (*Notícias, Domingo*) gave any visibility to the tragic events.

⁷⁷ [Digital 2024: Mozambique — DataReportal – Global Digital Insights](#)

and a significant presence on digital platforms. There are 18.9 million mobile phone connections active in the country, equivalent to 55 per cent of the population.

Social media, blogs and private websites operate in the country without major limitations. In February 2024, the National Institute of Communications of Mozambique (INCM) significantly increased Internet subscription prices generating national protests, mainly among young citizens. Four months later, and following negotiations with representatives of the youth, the government ordered the INCM to step back on its decision.

Although with a limited presence in the country, the role of Mozambican fact-checking groups in detecting fake news and disinformation is of great relevance.

Legal framework

The Constitution establishes that all citizens have the right to honour, good name, reputation and protection of their public image and privacy. In addition, article 71 of the Constitution identifies the need to legislate on the access, generation, protection and use of computerised personal data (whether by public or private entities). However, no specific legislation on data protection or privacy has yet been passed.

Few sources of law, including the Civil Code, the Penal Code, the Electronic Transactions Law or the Regulation on the Registration and Licensing of Intermediary Electronic Service Providers and Digital Platform Operators contemplate some tangential obligations on privacy. Among them, the Electronic Transactions Law (2017) is the one regulating data protection and privacy in a broader way. However, its provisions are still generic and insufficient. The law establishes the duties and responsibilities of the National Institute of Information and Communication Technologies (INTIC), the regulatory body in charge, among other tasks, of giving licences to IT service providers, supervise the sector and apply sanctions arising from non-compliance with the law. In November 2022, the INTIC proposed a draft for a Cybersecurity Law, which includes references to personal data protection. However, the law has not yet been passed.

On June 2019 Mozambique ratified the African Union Convention on Cybersecurity and Personal Data Protection.

Regarding the regulation of social networks in an electoral context, the electoral law does not lay down legal provisions on the use of digital platforms and social media by political parties and candidates during the election campaign period.

Recommendation: Elaborate and approve laws on data protection and cybersecurity according to existing international standards to guarantee citizens' privacy, including during elections.

Campaign in the social media

Campaign in the social media had limited outreach⁷⁸, with presidential candidates Mondlane and Chapo dominating most of the online election-related activity. The tone used by the candidates in their respective platforms was generally moderate, with derogatory language detected only in posts and comments by social media users.

⁷⁸ WhatsApp was not included in the EU EOM monitoring sample.

All four presidential candidates were present in the social media, with Facebook as the prevalent platform for campaigning. Most contenders did not show a well-defined communication pattern, and only Chapo resorted to a cross-platform strategy to garner more votes. According to reports by EU observers, parties and candidates at provincial and district level rarely used social networks for campaigning. The lack of access to Internet in many areas of the country and the high cost of Internet connections and smart phones, unaffordable for many citizens, resulted in local candidates prioritising gatherings and door-to-door visits rather than campaigning through social media. WhatsApp was used within provincial structures of political parties for internal communication rather than campaigning.

The four presidential candidates posted in their personal accounts mainly pictures, videos, reels and campaign spots. Mondlane and Chapo were by far the most active candidates in the social media, monopolising 86 per cent of all presidential candidates posts in Facebook, Instagram, TikTok and X during the entire campaign period (*see charts 3 and 4 in Annex 3*)⁷⁹. While Chapo showed more capacity and resources to elaborate videos and campaign spots of his activities in the field, Mondlane based his campaign in conducting live streaming (51 lives) of his rallies and *caravanas* in the provinces, gaining a high number of followers and interactions. Ossufo Momade also did some live streaming (28 lives) of his campaign activities in the field, although at a lower scale and capturing less audience.

Both Chapo and Mondlane registered a significant increase of followers in their social media accounts during campaign period, with the candidate of FRELIMO obtaining the highest percentage of increase (183 per cent) in TikTok, and the independent candidate registering the highest number of new followers (52,000) in Facebook (*see chart 6 in Annex 3*).

Social media monitoring results

From 24 August to 8 October the EU EOM monitored political and election-related information published in the main social media⁸⁰. Findings by the social media monitoring unit reflect that Mondlane was the presidential candidate with highest engagement combining the four platforms analysed (Facebook, Instagram, TikTok and X). From 24 August to 8 October, Mondlane's posts generated a total of 1.5 million interactions⁸¹, most of them (95 percent) registered on Facebook. Chapo, although more active on TikTok and Instagram than the other contenders, generated half of the interactions than Mondlane (737,587), while Momade and Simango, far behind their electoral rivals, registered 73,623 and 60,708 interactions respectively, mostly in Facebook (*see chart 7 and 8 in Annex 3*). The candidate of RENAMO was the one receiving the highest percentage of negative interactions (55 per cent of analysed interactions to his posts) and derogatory language by social media users⁸².

⁷⁹ By the end of campaign period the candidate with the most followers on Facebook was Mondlane (472,000 followers), while Chapo led on TikTok (65,600 followers), Instagram (58,600 followers) and X (876 followers) (*see chart 5 in Annex 3*).

⁸⁰ Data was collected using manual and automated techniques to elaborate quantitative and qualitative analysis and assess to which extent social networks represented a campaign platform for candidates and a source of truthful information for voters.

⁸¹ Data obtained through intelligent social listening and online monitoring platform, SentiOne.

⁸² Many internet users constantly referred to Ossufo Momade as “*Mafuta*” (fat, obese).

Political advertising in the social media reflected a significant imbalance of economic resources among contenders. According to Facebook Ad Library data⁸³, from the beginning of August until election day, FRELIMO and Chapo published 226 and 21 paid-for adverts, respectively, on Facebook/Instagram, for a total amount of 20,123 USD, whereas PODEMOS and Mondlane, the only remaining contenders of the presidential race with spots in the mentioned platforms, invested 200 USD in the publication of one paid-for advert each. FRELIMO and *Nova Democracia* kept active spots in Facebook during the campaign silence period.

Disinformation was present during campaign and post-election periods. The EU EOM detected several instances of disinformation circulating in the social media targeting Momade, Mondlane and the CNE. The EU EOM was also target of disinformation messages, trying to link the mission with fake assessments both in favour and against Mondlane (*see examples in Annex 3*). In this context, the fact-checking unit of the Media Institute of Southern Africa, MISA-Check, played an important role disproving fake news. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) assisted the CNE in fighting disinformation and detecting hate speech through an *ad hoc* social media monitoring unit (E+Monitor).

Recommendation: Stakeholders to take action to fight disinformation in the social media and strengthen fact-checking initiatives.

The EU EOM also identified a total of 51 and 23 inauthentic Facebook and Instagram accounts, respectively, out of which 68 supported Chapo⁸⁴.

During the post-election period, social media became crucial for opposition parties and citizens to denounce electoral irregularities. Mondlane used his Facebook page as main channel of communication to present the results of his parallel vote tabulation (PVT) and to call for national strikes and demonstrations through periodic live transmissions. His live message in the evening of 24 October, after CNE's announcement of official results, registered a national record with 115,000 online views. The following day, mobile Internet services of all three phone operators in the country suffered a data blackout at national level. The incident was a limitation to the right to information and freedom of expression by the government, preventing dissemination of information through social networks in a context of demonstrations around the country.

Videos and pictures allegedly providing evidence of irregularities during counting and tabulation processes were widely circulated in the social media. Similarly, in the post-election period, many videos documenting the disproportionate reaction of police forces towards citizens demonstrating in Maputo and other parts of the country after the killing of Elvino Dias and Paulo Guambe circulated widely on Facebook and WhatsApp groups. Posts by users containing messages inciting to violence also circulated on social media (mainly Facebook and WhatsApp groups) following Mondlane's messages calling for a national strike and demonstrations to reject election results.

⁸³ [Relatório da Biblioteca de Anúncios \(facebook.com\)](#).

⁸⁴ Out of the remaining six accounts, three Facebook accounts were against Chapo, two Instagram accounts supported Mondlane and one Instagram account was against Mondlane.

PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN

While women are well represented in parliament, support to deepen their political participation is still required

Women were well represented in the previous AR and in the government⁸⁵. This is in contrast to lower levels of governance where women remain under-represented. Following the 2023 local elections six women (9.2 per cent) were elected to preside over city councils, a decrease compared to 2018 when 11.3 per cent of women elected.

Women represented 53 per cent of registered voters. Progressive legislation including the Constitution, the Law Against Domestic Violence, and the Law Against Premature Unions provides for conditions for the advancement towards gender equality. While there are no mandatory quotas for elective positions, parties apply voluntary quotas: FRELIMO and RENAMO with 30 per cent, while MDM aimed at applying alternation of women and men on their lists. Quotas were applied inconsistently and none of the candidacies implemented the zebra alternation system on their AR lists.

Despite positive indicators, civil society criticised the insufficient representation of women as presidential candidates and as heads of party lists and proposed that legislation ensure mandatory parity with ‘zebra’ alternation on party lists.

Women activists from *Forum Mulheres* considered that women were called upon by the parties to mobilise the electorate during the campaign and given ample visibility in this function, but remain excluded from decision-making bodies. This practice was also noted by EU observers. Party programmes do not always include women’s priorities while elected women fail to carry women’s perspective during their mandates.

Women face difficulties in entering and remaining in political life. The prevalence of conservative cultural patterns in society and the administrative and discriminatory practices when it comes to meeting the requirements for candidacies, are some examples. Economic exclusion due to a lack of resources by parties to promote and train their female cadres can be a barrier to their wider participation. Civil society highlighted the environment of physical, psychological and verbal violence women often face, especially during the campaign, discouraging their participation⁸⁶.

95 women were elected to the National Assembly (38 per cent) out of a total of 250. This represents a decline compared to the 42 per cent female representation in the previous Assembly. FRELIMO was the party that elected the greater proportion of women in relative terms (46 per cent), followed by MDM (38 per cent), RENAMO (29 per cent) and PODEMOS (12 per cent). Three women won provincial governorships in Niassa, Gaza and Manica elected by FRELIMO. There were 128 women candidates at the top of party lists for the parliamentary poll, about 30 per cent of the total number of first places contested.

⁸⁵ In the National Assembly women represented with 42 per cent, and in the executive 45 per cent (2022) with women occupying several high-level positions.

⁸⁶ The United Nations Women representative emphasised that ‘*violence against women in elections is a critical issue that requires immediate attention and collective action*’.

PARTICIPATION OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES

Implementation of the new law is paramount to achieve effective inclusion.

Mozambique ratified the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), including its Optional Protocol in 2010. More recently in 2021, it further ratified the Protocol to the African Charter on Human Rights and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in Africa (African Protocol on Disability). Legal protection for persons with disabilities (PwD), is imbedded in the Constitution with the full enjoyment of rights and obligations, and with the right to special protection from the family, the society and the State⁸⁷. Several laws have been approved in the past pertaining to the rights of this group⁸⁸ with the most recent one passed in June 2024 on the promotion and protection of the rights of PwDs. This is the first law of its kind and represents a milestone in the domestication of the CRPD and the African Protocol on Disability. The law provides for detailed regulations to be adopted by 7 October 2024, the date on which the law entered into force.

The umbrella organisation Forum of Mozambican Associations of People with Disabilities (FAMOD) expressed concerns about the delay in the adoption of the regulation and its negative impact on these elections. FAMOD pointed at gaps in the law as for instance the lack of inclusion of a mandatory quota for PwDs to secure jobs, including in election related bodies or as temporary workers, trainers and polling stations members.

FAMOD indicated that inaccessibility is widespread during the registration of voters and voting, as is the lack of disability friendly voting materials. They further criticised the lethargy of the bodies responsible for ensuring full political participation, advocating for the removal of physical barriers, for ramps to be installed at PS, sign language be made available on TV campaign messages, and the inclusion of PwDs as trainers and poll workers. Official data point at 2.6 per cent of PwDs in Mozambique while the World Health Organisation estimates at least 15 per cent of the population having some kind of disability.

During the campaign the rights of PwDs and specific policies addressed to their needs were seldom mentioned by the presidential candidates. Political parties did not include PwDs on their party lists while they were also absent as speakers from the majority of the campaign events observed by the EU EOM.

CITIZEN AND INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVATION

Organised civil society observation brought more transparency to the elections.

According to the CNE 25,101 domestic observers were accredited. Based on previous experiences, national election observer groups requested their accreditations well ahead of deadlines, even though the law provides CPEs five days from submission of requests to issue accreditations. Despite smoother processing compared to 2023 local elections, *Mais Integridade* consortium

⁸⁷ With the exception of those obligation for which PwDs are incapable in result of their disability. Constitution, Article 37 and 125.

⁸⁸ The legal framework included, among other, the Resolution nr. 20 of the Council of Ministers 23 June 1999, Law nr. 4, 7 February 2007; Law nr. 23, 1 August 2007, Decree nr. 53, 30 December 2008 and Resolution nr. 68, 27 November 2009 on the strategy for PwDs in the Public Service.

observers experienced difficulties and delays in obtaining their accreditations in the province of Zambézia, receiving their accreditations only 48 hours before polling day, which hampered the timely deployment of observers.

The CNE accredited 8,151 national observers from the Provincial Youth Councils (CPJ), known for their affiliation to FRELIMO, which significantly increased the number of national observers. The legitimacy of the CPJ's eligibility as a citizen observer could be questioned, given their political affiliation and the right to cast a ballot (special vote) at the polling station were deployed on election day.

For political parties accreditations FRELIMO deployed on average two party agents per PS countrywide. Other parties were present with lower number of agents. The high figure of 9,777 FRELIMO agents in Cabo Delgado, averaging over 4.5 agents per PS despite the legal limit of one agent and one substitute per station, remains unexplained⁸⁹.

The EU EOM considered that the introduction of election authorities notifications to observers and the media to access tabulation processes lacked clear guidelines, was not applied consistently, and contradicted principles of domestic and international observation⁹⁰.

Recommendation: Ensure systematic and timely accreditation and notification by the National Election Commission of party representatives, observers and the media.

Civil society observation, conducted by platforms like *Mais Integridade*, *Sala da Paz* and *Decide*, significantly enhanced election transparency. The *Mais Integridade*, with some 1,900 observers, brought together seven organisations, including the Centre for Public Integrity (CIP), the Episcopal Commission for Justice and Peace (CEJP) and the Civil Society Learning and Training Centre (CESC)⁹¹. The *Sala da Paz* worked with the Institute for Multiparty Democracy and over fifty other organisations; and *Decide* was composed of three main organisations⁹².

These organisations raised concerns over pre-election issues such as the misuse of public resources in campaigns, public servants' participation in FRELIMO campaign events, collection of voter cards and registration of voter's personal details. These platforms published their findings and reported on polling irregularities⁹³. The CIP claimed manipulated data was inserted during the tabulation process in the district of Mulevala, in Zambézia, by presenting a spreadsheet extract with results per PS for the presidential election (*mapa de apuramento distrital*)⁹⁴. The report indicated how votes for Momade and Mondlane were converted into invalid votes.

Mais Integridade's preliminary report stated that the PVT conducted in Nampula and Zambézia could not provide an accurate projection of the election results for the provinces because the

⁸⁹ Percentages of accreditations issued according to the number of PS per province to the PODEMOS, RENAMO and MDM parties showed significant discrepancies between provinces, unlike FRELIMO. Article 56 (1) of the electoral law 15/2024 stipulates that "each proposing political party, coalition of political parties or group of voting citizens has the right to appoint, from among the voters, one effective delegate and one alternate delegate for each PS".

⁹⁰ Articles 101 (A), 110 (A) and 119 (B) of the electoral law 15/CNE/2024.

⁹¹ A EU-funded democracy support project implemented by International IDEA and receiving additional support from the UK. The *Mais Integridade* organised a parallel vote tabulation (PVT) in the provinces of Nampula and Zambezia, registered voters within these two provinces representing 36.4 per cent of the in-country voting population.

⁹² PLAOSC, the Manica-based civil society platform, deployed about 600 observers in the province of Manica.

⁹³ Media reported on 13 October about the case of a national observer of the National Youth Council, an organisation affiliated to FRELIMO, severely beaten for allegedly trying to corrupt a PODEMOS delegate to favour FRELIMO.

⁹⁴ CIP Bulletin n.311 on 13 October 2024.

election process at polling stations level was marred by several irregularities that it was impossible to determine the real election results. Nonetheless, the PVT exercise hinted to some opposition votes being converted into blank and invalid votes, as well as noting an excessive number of special votes⁹⁵.

These organisations expressed their outrage over the assassinations of Elvino Dias and Paulo Guambe. *Mais Integridade* viewed these acts as intimidation targeting its members, who had actively denounced the electoral fraud that marred the electoral process in favour of the ruling party and its candidates⁹⁶. On 25 October, CIP and *Mais Integridade's* members, and the Centre for Democracy and Human Rights (CDD) called for a recount of votes at every PS and the publication of PS results.

The CNE accredited 564 international observers including the African Union (AU), the Southern African Development Cooperation (SADC), the Commonwealth Observation Group (COG), the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries (CPLP) and the International Republican Institute (IRI), which deployed short-term election observation missions⁹⁷. Preliminary findings formulated by the AU and SADC acknowledged positive achievements on the conduct of election day but highlighted late amendments in the electoral law and costly repeated production of a new voter register for each election, among others. The AU recommended the implementation of transparent measures in the electoral results management process. COG and IRI reports offered specific recommendations emphasising the need for transparent results publication and diligent result announcements. CPLP advised the use of digital media for efficient result dissemination at all levels, from PS to national level.

ELECTORAL DISPUTES

Ineffective dispensation of electoral justice due to legal uncertainty, the absence of evidence presented and the lack of knowledge of dispute resolution rules on the part of the parties involved.

Complaints and Appeals

The legal framework for electoral dispute resolution of complaints and appeals is contained in the Constitution, in the election laws nr. 14/2024 and 15/2024, in the Directive nr. 1/2024 issued by the Supreme Court on 23 August and in abundant jurisprudence by the CC.

The Constitution stipulates the method of appointment of the seven members of the CC, with five magistrates nominated by the AR, reflecting the political composition of the parliament and a

⁹⁵ According to Law 15/2024, article 77, a person may exercise their right to vote at polling stations, when duly accredited, even if they are not registered on the corresponding electoral roll. Special votes can be cast by polling staff, party delegates, police agents deployed at the PS, national observers and media, and members of the EMB. Special vote ballots are processed at the same time as the other ballot papers, and should be recorded in the PS minutes.

⁹⁶ *Decide's* representative interrupted the session of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights held in Banjul on 19 October, Gambia, among others, to protest against the murder of Elvino Dias and Paulo Guambe.

⁹⁷ Additional missions included the Electoral Commissions Forum of SADC Countries, the African Centre for Governance, the Diplomatic Election Watch formed by diplomats from Canada, Japan, the UK and the US diplomatic missions in Mozambique.

president appointed by the President of the Republic. The CC is the apex body for electoral justice⁹⁸ and its competence during elections includes the verification of the legal requirements of presidential candidacies, and the validation and announcement of final results. The CC adjudicates, as a second instance, on appeals against decisions taken at PS and tabulation centres and also, at times, as a single instance when the petitioner demands the annulment of an election. A decision taken by the lower levels of the election administration can be appealed to the district courts and further to the CC. Any decision taken by the CNE may be subject of an appeal to the CC with CC decisions being final.

The political appointment of judges is seen by some interlocutors as potentially tipping CC decisions in favour of the ruling party, contributing to public mistrust in its ability to deliver electoral justice. Judges have called for financial independence to be granted, considering this a crucial condition for the impartiality of the judiciary.

Judicial courts at district level, which come under the direction of the Supreme Court, (TS) are the entry point to file a case against an irregularity that occurred during voting and counting at PS, at district and provincial level. They are also competent for the adjudication on election petitions against election results. An amendment to the CC Organic Law, passed in June 2024, clarified that during the electoral process the CC establishes a direct line of work with the district courts⁹⁹.

Overall, the legal framework does not fully guarantee the right to an effective remedy due to the lack of clarity of the pre-conditions to file petitions. In particular, a pre-condition for the acceptance of a petition by the district courts was to have filed a protest or a complaint at the moment the irregularity was observed at the PS or tabulation. A recent amendment to the election law removed this prerequisite from article 192 (1)¹⁰⁰. In the past, opposition parties claimed that they were prevented from submitting a protest at PS, mainly by PS presidents, or were expelled from the PS during the voting and counting process, leaving them with no means to comply with the legal requirement.

The lack of clarity on the necessity of a prior impugnation was the subject of legal uncertainty during the 2019 and 2023 elections, and again in 2024 with several district courts and the CC continuing to reject petitions and appeals based on the lack of this requirement¹⁰¹. While the CC publicly clarified it considers the principle to remain valid, some legal analysts hold a different opinion suggesting that the CC should accept petitions on electoral matters on the basis of a comprehensive human rights-based approach to ensuring political participation and electoral

⁹⁸Constitution, Article 240. The seventh member is appointed by the Superior Counsel of Judicial Magistrates. The current CC composition includes five magistrates indicated by FRELIMO and one from RENAMO. Magistrates have a five-year mandate, renewable once.

⁹⁹ Law 11/2024.

¹⁰⁰ The current Election Law 15/2024, in Article 192(1) prescribes: “Irregularities during voting and district or city, provincial, general and national tabulation can be reviewed in a contentious appeal.” Before the amendment to Article 192(1), introduced on 23 August 2024, the same Article stipulated: “Irregularities that may occur during voting and district or city, provincial, general and national tabulation can be reviewed in a contentious appeal, provided they have been the subject of a complaint or protest.”

¹⁰¹ Appeals filed by PODEMOS were rejected for lack of previous impugnation by district courts in Cuamba, Morrumbala and Ile, and in a decision by the CC in a case appealed from the district court in Marromeu. A petition presented by MDM (Marromeu) and a case presented by RENAMO (Milanje), both at district courts, were rejected.

justice. The resulting legal ambiguity negatively affected the certainty of this phase of the electoral process¹⁰².

The administration of electoral justice in district courts is perceived by many stakeholders to be more impartial, as judges are not politically appointed¹⁰³. EU observers also noted a general lack of knowledge by political parties and candidates of the legal framework regarding electoral complaints, especially in rural areas. For these elections judges and public prosecutors received training on electoral dispute resolution¹⁰⁴.

Electoral Offences

Electoral offences are stipulated in the law and include a wide range of prohibited activities during the election campaign, polling and counting¹⁰⁵. The most common offences include the incitement to violence during the campaign, the misuse of public resources, the destruction of campaign material, the breach of the duties to report on funding and spending, multiple voting, vote buying, ballot stuffing, refusal to accept electoral complaints, refusal to distribute result sheets, fraud while counting or tabulation, obstruction to the activities of party agents, candidates or party agents, among others. A person committing an electoral offence is liable to a fine or imprisonment, or both.

The recent legal review raised the sanctions of imprisonment for some of the electoral offences aiming at enhancing its dissuading effect. Penalties of imprisonment cannot be replaced by fines or community work while criminal proceedings for offences relating to electoral operations are statute-barred within one year of the commission of the punishable act¹⁰⁶.

According to the TS a total of 163 electoral offences were lodged at district courts in all provinces, 69 of which related to the destruction of propaganda material during the campaign period, in addition to 18 instances referred to ballot stuffing and 17 instances where the work of the PS was disturbed, among others. Some 83 cases were dismissed and in 78 instances the courts applied sanctions including fines and imprisonment¹⁰⁷. Although cases of electoral offences are dealt with by the courts, the CNE failed to take responsibility for the integrity of the electoral process by not addressing the impact of the electoral offences on the election results.

Recommendation: The CNE to take full responsibility for the integrity of the electoral process, by adopting measures to address the consequences of electoral offences and malpractices during voting, counting and tabulation of results to diminish their impact on the election results.

¹⁰² A future harmonisation of the legal framework should include the clarification of prior impugnation.

¹⁰³ Concerns about the security of magistrates ruling on electoral matters in past elections, and in 2024, were raised by some judges who felt pressured by public protests outside the courts or by threats received.

¹⁰⁴ Legal aid was available with the aim to harmonise the administration of electoral justice at the first instance courts. A Help Line and a WhatsApp group providing legal advice to increase consistency in the assessment of electoral offences and irregularities was established.

¹⁰⁵ Articles 170 to 215 of Law 14/2024 and articles 198 to 243 of Law 15/2024.

¹⁰⁶ Fines can vary from a few minimum wages to a maximum of 50 minimum wages while the duration of imprisonment may vary from three months to eight years.

¹⁰⁷ Nampula, Niassa, Maputo City, Zambezia, Maputo Province and Tete registered the highest number of electoral offences.

Election Petitions

A limited number of election petitions were submitted to the CC prior the 9 October elections. The most relevant case was in relation to the de-registration of the coalition CAD.

The TS informed the EU EOM that a total of 142 election petitions were filed with district courts with 70 petitions lodged by PODEMOS, 51 by RENAMO, 15 by MDM¹⁰⁸. In only nine instances the petitions were either resolved or partially resolved. The high rejection rate of petitions (95 per cent) caused considerable frustration among those affected and rendered legal redress inefficient. The TS attributed this high rate to the lack of legal capacity of political parties to file complaints but in fact one third of cases were rejected for the lack of observance of the outdated principle of prior impugnation, while the rest mainly for lack of proof, and for missing the legal deadline, among others. In addition, 18 appeals against district court decisions were filed with the CC that proceeded to confirm their rulings, while also forwarding some instances of criminal offences to the Public Prosecutor's office for investigation.

The main opposition parties - RENAMO, MDM and PODEMOS - submitted complaints alleging that they were obstructed from observing the voting, counting, and tabulation processes, among other irregularities.

PODEMOS lodged several petitions including with the district court of Morrumbala, in Zambézia, claiming that in 26 PS their party agents were not permitted to observe voting and counting. The petition requested the annulment of the polls and PS presidents to be held accountable for the obstruction. The case was dismissed by the district court for lack of prior impugnation, however, the court recognised irregularities might have occurred and invited the Public Prosecutor to conduct investigations into the case presented. The case was appealed to the CC and dismissed on the same argument. In another case filed at the district court in Cuamba, PODEMOS claimed that the number of votes cast for the three elections varied, and it had not been possible to present a protest as the party was not notified of the start of the district tabulation. The district court rejected the petition on the same grounds while the CC, in the appeal, ruled it would decide on this petition during the validation phase as only then could it evaluate the impact of the alleged irregularities on the election result.

RENAMO filed a case with the STAE in Zambézia province for the annulment of the tabulation process in eight districts, claiming their party representatives were not allowed to follow the tabulation¹⁰⁹. In a further petition to the district court, RENAMO asserted that in Quelimane the official results tally provided to party agents did not correspond with those presented by the CED during district tabulation, which gave rise to concerns regarding the accuracy of the tabulation process. Furthermore, the petition stated that EU observers were denied access to observe the tabulation in that location¹¹⁰. The party requested an immediate review of the tabulation results and the implementation of measures to ensure the integrity of the process. The request was dismissed.

Additionally, a joint complaint by RENAMO, PODEMOS, MDM and *Nova Democracia* filed at the district court in Quelimane asserted that the tabulation process was conducted exclusively by

¹⁰⁸ In addition, two cases were filed in a joint petition by RENAMO, MDM, PODEMOS and AMUSI; two petitions were lodged by *Nova Democracia*; one by AMUSI; and one joint case filed by MDM, RENAMO and PODEMOS.

¹⁰⁹ The districts affected were Namacura, Gurué, Milange, Pebane, Mulombo, Morrumbala, Mocubela and Mulevala.

¹¹⁰ EU observers were in fact denied access to observe tabulation in this particular instance.

FRELIMO clerks, thereby lacking impartiality and transparency. The parties requested the data entry process be made public and accessible to all party agents during the tabulation period. The request was not taken into consideration by the CED.

The CC ruled on seven post-election appeals within the prescribed deadline, mostly confirming district court decisions that had dismissed the petition in the first instance. In cases where the CC considered that a deeper investigation was warranted because alleged irregularities could affect the outcome of the election, it deferred its decision to a later stage during the validation process, for which there is no legal deadline.

VOTING, COUNTING AND TABULATION OF RESULTS

Counting and tabulation processes were impacted by lack of transparency and irregularities.

EU EOM observers reported some cases of potential ballot box stuffing before or during their presence at PS, with polling staff failing to act impartially at some stations. Turnout rates for the Presidential and National Assembly elections were 43.3 per cent and 43.7 per cent respectively, with significant variations between constituencies, being the second lowest participation since the 2004 elections¹¹¹.

There were irregularities and anomalies during counting and some cases of unjustified alteration of election results at PS. The counting was marked by evident disorganisation and inaccuracies, compounded by the lack of adequate material conditions, such as poor light at PS. These factors, combined with a lax implementation of procedures, had a detrimental impact on the credibility and integrity of the count at PS.

The EU EOM found that the observed district tabulation and transmission of results processes established by the electoral authorities were flawed. There was a notable absence of consistency and transparency in the process. EU observers were prevented by the EMB to observe tabulation processes in some districts and provinces.

The tabulation of results at the provincial level and the centralisation of results at national level did not dissipate concerns regarding the transparency and reliability of the process. While the CNE acted without accountability for the process, updates on progressive results were absent and the public was unable to access the results below the provincial level of vote aggregation, which undermined confidence in the vote outcome. All opposition parties and presidential candidates, except FRELIMO, rejected the provisional results.

Overview of Voting

Elections were held in 25,725 PS across Mozambique and in 602 PS in the diaspora¹¹². PS were secured by nearly 25,000 police officers. On 11 October, the CNE rescheduled elections in 23 PS

¹¹¹ Maputo Province and Maputo City showed the highest turnout with 64 and 63 per cent while the province of Nampula and Niassa the lowest with 28.4 and 32.9 per cent respectively.

¹¹² Diaspora voting was facilitated in several countries, with PS allocated as follows: South Africa hosted 359 PS for 215,831 registered voters, followed by Tanzania with 75, Malawi with 61, Zimbabwe with 60, Zambia with 11, Eswatini with 10, and Kenya with eight. In Europe, the CNE approved five PS in Germany to serve 670 registered voters and 13 in Portugal for 1,177 registered voters.

General and Provincial Assembly Elections, 9 October 2024

in the districts of Gilé and Maganja da Costa (Zambézia) due to polling staff strikes requesting food allowances. In Germany elections were rescheduled due to logistical difficulties in deploying election kits. The reschedule voting took place on 12 October,

The EU EOM observed opening, voting and counting in 79, 729 and 77 PS respectively, covering 78 out of 161 districts in all provinces and Maputo city¹¹³.

Opening procedures were assessed by EU observers as very good in 32 PS, good in 42 PS, and bad in 5 PS out of the 79 PS observed (58 in urban areas). Most observed PS opened on time, with the occasional delays caused by a lack of electoral materials and deficient preparation of staff. Voting proved to be slow and some voters had difficulty locating their PS.

EU observers rated the overall conduct of polling as “good” and “very good” in over 97 per cent of the observed stations. Voting procedures were respected in more than 86 per cent of the observed PS. In 40 per cent of the PS visited, queues of over 30 people were observed.

Despite this positive assessment, EU observers reported practices suggesting potential ballot box stuffing before their arrival or in their presence, including: four cases where voters received more than one ballot per election; 30 cases of improperly sealed ballot boxes; instances in five out of 182 PS where seal numbers did not match those recorded in polling logbooks. Observers noted that polling staff failed to act impartially in one out of every nine observed PS.

The EU EOM noted that the voting process was marked by procedural shortcomings that could negatively impact the integrity and credibility of the election process. These included: recording security seals’ numbers in notebooks rather than official operations protocols; failing to record the number of received ballots in any electoral document; ballot boxes lacking PS identification; and the absence of requirement for voters to sign the voter list after casting their ballot, instead polling staff simply crossed out voters’ names.

EU observers reported that some voters with valid voter cards were not found on the voter list at their designated PS preventing them from voting. in line with the CC jurisprudence issued during the 2023 municipal elections. The EU EOM noted positively the improved design of results sheets which include records of the number of authorised voters who voted outside their assigned PS (special vote).

The presence of party agents contributed to election transparency¹¹⁴, In Gaza and Sofala provinces, EU observers reported cases of accredited PODEMOS agents being denied entry to PS, a practice also documented by national observers. EU observers witnessed accredited party agents from *Nova Democracia* party (ND) in Quelimane (Zambézia) and from PODEMOS in Matola (Maputo Province) and Massingir (Gaza) who were either denied access (in the first two districts) or expelled for raising concerns about ballot boxes placed too close to polling staff. Of the 13 cases of intimidation observed, approximately half involved representatives from parties or candidates.

¹¹³ Administratively there are 154 districts countrywide. For election purposes, a 161 District and City Election Commissions administer the election.

¹¹⁴ EU observers noted the presence of FRELIMO, RENAMO, MDM and PODEMOS agents in 98 per cent, 59 per cent, 34 per cent and 59 per cent of the observed PS, respectively.

Observers from *Mais Intergridade*, *Sala da Paz* and *Decide* were present in ten, seven and one percent of the observed PS, respectively, with other observer groups present in 23 per cent¹¹⁵.

On a positive note, women were 57 per cent of staff in the observed stations. EU observers found that 30 per cent of PS layouts were not suitable for voters with reduced mobility.

Counting

Out of the 77 counting processes observed (65 in urban areas), EU observers assessed the process “bad” and “very bad” in 24 and 4 polling stations respectively. In some locations, counting continued into the early hours of 11 October¹¹⁶. Although results sheets were not posted in eight of the 77 observed counting sessions, nearly all party agents present received copies.

In 28 out of 77 count processes, teams observed that the count lacked transparency, with inaccuracies reported in 25 counts¹¹⁷. In seven PS, party officials or unidentified individuals interfered with the process. In 16 out of 51 stations, where the number of ballots in each ballot box was compared to the number of voters marked on the voter list, the ballot count exceeded the voter count for each election. EU observers reported stacks of folded ballot papers in ten counting processes followed, both issues indicating possible ballot stuffing. In 17 out of 77 counting stations EU observers noted ballots being declared invalid despite the clear intention of the voter, illustrating the lack of applying clear and unequivocal procedures¹¹⁸.

Polling staff showed difficulty to complete protocols accurately in one third of observed PS, and numbers in the results sheets did not reconcile in 26 PS of the 77 observed processes. The public announcement of ballot paper serial number during counting continued to raise concerns about vote secrecy, as reported by the 2019 EU EOM. In eight PS observed the results sheets were not posted outside the PS for public viewing, which is a critical aspect of electoral transparency.

The irregular alteration of results was directly observed by the EU EOM in a PS in Moatize district (Tete) where observers witnessed significantly altered results posted at the PS following the count they observed.

Recommendation: Review and ensure proper implementation of polling and counting procedures to enhance safeguards and improve the integrity and transparency of the process.

Tabulation of Results

The tabulation process occurred at three administrative levels - district or city, provincial and national, following specific timeframes.

¹¹⁵ EU observers in Quelimane reported that observers from the Provincial Youth Council (CPJ) accredited by CPE Zambézia with 6,000 accreditations, were present, though primarily in polling centres rather than in PS, suggesting possible instances of multiple voting facilitated by polling staff through the special voting procedure. In the district of Marromeu (Sofala), EU observers reported an observer from *Decide* being illegally expelled from a PS.

¹¹⁶ The longest counting process observed by the EU EOM lasted up to 19 hours.

¹¹⁷ The one-hour break was not respected in 16 of the 77 observations. In four cases, the integrity of the process may have been compromised during these breaks. In 14 observed processes the count was hampered by poor lighting.

¹¹⁸ The provision limiting the validity of a ballot to an “X” sign or the voter’s fingerprint resulting in the potential invalidation of ballots that clearly indicate the voters’ intention.

District Tabulation

The EU EOM observed tabulation in 51 of 161 districts from 10 to 12 October. The results management system established by the CNE lacked reliability and integrity, with EU observers rating 23 out of these 51 processes as “bad” or “very bad.”

In four locations in Zambézia province, EU observers were asked to leave the tabulation centre on the second day of the process, after noting discrepancies between the results from PS and the tabulated figures¹¹⁹. In Marromeu (Sofala) and Pebane (Zambézia), EU observers were not allowed to observe. In Gurué (Zambezia), EU observers were not allowed to take notes and witnessed PS staff rewriting results sheets as instructed by STAE officials. EU observers reported parts of the tabulation process being conducted behind closed doors in Inhambane (Inhambane) and Pebane (Zambézia).

In Matola (Maputo Province), EU observers witnessed deliberate result falsification, with results sheets arriving unsealed, and *Nova Democracia* party representatives refusing to sign them. In Inhambane, EU observers reported that CDE results consolidated by the CPE differed from those directly observed in three districts. In Nampula district, EU observers were required to leave after the police arrested STAE officials suspected of withholding polling staff payments. Observation resumed once the process was restored¹²⁰.

EU observers noted several critical issues: lack of transparency; envelopes with PS results received unsealed and completed at district level; bags with unsealed results sheets; challenged ballots not requalified in 23 out of 24 cases observed; and results in the database not matching PS results in five out of 36 cases where observers could see closely enough the numbers being computed.

CNE notifications to EU observers on tabulation place and time mandated by the 2024 Electoral Law, were sent to fewer than a third of EU observers through varying methods and timeframes¹²¹. Responsibilities and involvement of election officials varied by district due to tabulation centre locations (e.g. at CDE/CECs, STAEs premises, or other locations). One-fourth of these locations were found unsuitable to conduct the process. Party representatives when present, were often unaware of their rights and responsibilities denoting a lack of training. EU observers reported seven cases of expulsion involving domestic observers or party representatives. Election officials failed to share copies of results’ sheets with observers and/or journalists in 19 of 27 situations observed.

During results entry into Excel spreadsheets, EU observers noted discrepancies in data entry methods and Excel spreadsheets configurations such as totals of votes not included, and absence of standard settings to prevent inconsistent data entry. The electoral administration could not

¹¹⁹ Alto Molocue, Mocuba, Quelimane and Maganja da Costa districts.

¹²⁰ Several districts observed by the EU EOM, Nampula, Quelimane and Morrumbala in Zambézia, Tete and Ulongwe in Tete, and Beira in Sofala ended the tabulation on 13 October, beyond the legal deadline.

¹²¹ In *Ilha de Moçambique* (Nampula), election officials gave conflicting information to observers regarding place and time of tabulation. The EU EOM considered this action to be a deliberate attempt to hinder observation. Some districts began the tabulation process only after all PS materials were received, while others, following the law, started with the arrival of first materials

General and Provincial Assembly Elections, 9 October 2024

enforce a uniform data entry process in district tabulation centres¹²², paving the way for officials to enter results that did not match PS results, either deliberately or inadvertently¹²³.

The EU EOM gathered and analysed 121 official provisional district level results¹²⁴. In seven districts the analysis showed an evident and unusually high difference in the number of ballots cast in different elections – Presidential, AR and AP. In these seven districts, the number of votes cast in the AR election was between 15 per cent to 80 per cent higher than in the presidential election and practically all these additional votes appear to have been added to the incumbent party. The evidence suggests that just in these seven districts, FRELIMO appears to have been unduly awarded over 150,000 additional votes¹²⁵.

EU observers also directly observed such situations that might point at manipulation: in Manhiça district (Maputo Province), the EU observers noted the results from all PS as they were read aloud during the tabulation. At the end, the sums for all candidates were matching with the announced results, except for candidate Chapo who received, instead of 28,000 votes (as summed from PS results by EU observers) a total of 42,485 votes (a surplus of 14,000 votes). The same occurred in the AR and AP elections where FRELIMO party received a surplus of 10,000 and 13,000 votes respectively. The voter turnout figures differed among the three elections by some 5-6 per cent, thus the alteration of results remained concealed in the official results.

In Kamubukwana (Maputo City) there were some 25,000 more votes in the AR election than in the presidential election, all of them being attributed to FRELIMO. While the first version of the district results protocols maintained this difference also in the turnout figures, a second version (apparently prepared by the provincial tabulation centre) tried to disguise this difference by artificially increasing the number of blank ballots (surplus of 17,000) and invalid ballots (surplus of 8,000) to make the turnout in both elections more or less equal.

Likewise, the EU EOM directly observed late alteration of district tabulation results in three districts of Inhambane when the results orally presented at the end of the tabulation process were significantly modified in the official results sheets produced the following day¹²⁶.

Provincial Tabulation

EU observers covered the tabulation process in all ten provinces and the city of Maputo from 13 to 15 October¹²⁷. Provincial tabulation, based on district results, was better organised than district-

¹²² The STAE confirmed to the EU EOM that district tabulation centres could use manual or spreadsheet-based tabulation, as neither a uniform templates nor a centralisation software component was shared with district officials. EMBs acknowledged no specific guidelines were produced prior to the elections, though CNE and STAE officials visited provinces and districts in September to discuss the tabulation process.

¹²³ After completion, provisional districts results were disseminated via media and social media. The CNE/STAE website and Facebook account remained inactive. At the time of writing, the results from 40 out of 161 districts were not available neither for the EU EOM nor for national actors.

¹²⁴ In a combined effort, the EU EOM, together with in International IDEA and regional structures of certain political parties, gathered district level results only from 121 out of a total of 161 districts.

¹²⁵ These districts include: Chibuto (Gaza) with a surplus of 15 per cent cast votes for AR when compared to the Presidential vote; Kamubukwana (Maputo City) with a surplus of 24 per cent cast votes for AR; Inhambane City with a surplus of 21 per cent cast votes for AR; Massinga (Inhambane) with a surplus of 83 per cent cast votes for AR; Maxixe (Inhambane) with a surplus of 21 per cent cast votes for AR; Quelimane (Zambézia) with a surplus of 30 per cent cast votes for AR; Pebane (Zambézia) with a surplus of 60 per cent cast votes for AR.

¹²⁶ Despite the reiterated calls by the EU EOM and other national and international actors, PS level results were not published. The complete lack of disaggregated polling data rendered the analysis more difficult and less transparent.

¹²⁷ Only two CPEs notified observers of start times and locations (Maputo and Gaza provinces).

level tabulation. The CPE used standardised centralisation software, with FRELIMO, RENAMO and MDM representatives present in half of the observed centres, and PODEMOS in one-fifth.

Three provinces completed the tabulation process on the first day¹²⁸, while four extended beyond the 14 October legal deadline¹²⁹. Four EU observer teams rated the process “bad” or “very bad” in Inhambane, Maputo Province, Nampula and Zambézia due to lack of transparency, secrecy, and restriction on observing the data entry.

EU observers noted deliberate alterations to blank and invalid votes counts in the presidential elections in KaMubukwana (Maputo city). In Zambézia, the CPE did not authorise EU observers to observe the entire process, allowing only short visits and attendance at the result announcement event. In Sofala, the CPE delayed tabulation pending the receipt of results from PS from the districts of Beira, in Chibabava, Dondo and Nhamatanda.

National Tabulation

No public updates on the progressive tabulation process were made between the 15 October and the publication of provisional national results on 24 October. The EU EOM’s request to observe the data entry process, which used an updated 2023 centralisation software, went unanswered¹³⁰.

A CNE plenary session for national tabulation took place on 23 October in the presence of party delegates, observers, and the media¹³¹. During a three-hour presentation, supported by STAE, the CNE did not compile or verify provincial results nor referred to district-level results as required by law¹³². Instead, the CNE presented a slideshow of aggregated provincial and national results, including legislative and provincial seat allocations. The CNE reported that it had reached consensus on preliminary results in 87 per cent of the 161 districts and 9 of 11 electoral constituencies, with voting required in the remaining districts, and in Tete and Zambezia.

At the plenary session, party representatives stated their complaints first verbally, then in writing after the session was suspended at 20:00h. The CNE approved the provisional results by nine votes against seven¹³³, after deliberating in sessions closed to observers on the complaints submitted by RENAMO, MDM and PODEMOS during the night of 23 and 24 October. The EU EOM noted that the complaint lodged by the representative of candidate Mondlane was not examined by the CNE¹³⁴. Objecting the election results, seven CNE members demanded a recount of the votes in the polling stations where there was a discrepancy in the number of voters in the three elections, the requalification of the invalid votes, or the cancellation of the 2024 general elections¹³⁵. The EU EOM observed that parties were denied the opportunity to file complaints.

¹²⁸ In Cabo Delgado, Maputo City, and Manica.

¹²⁹ In Nampula, Niassa, Sofala, Tete and Zambézia.

¹³⁰ The CNE began receiving preliminary results from CPEs on 14 October, informing the EOM that it completed receipt of results from all provinces and diaspora by 18 October.

¹³¹ The CNE used the maximum time allowed by law, unlike in 2019 when the process took four days less.

¹³² Article N°119 of the Electoral Law N°5/2024.

¹³³ Deliberation N°105/CNE/2024, 24 October 2024. As detailed on 24 October, one CNE member was apologised for not being available, the declaration annexed to the deliberation containing only six signatories.

¹³⁴ Initiated at 16:00h in the presence of observers and media, the session lasted until 04:00h on 24 October. The EU EOM observed the submission of the complaint lodged by the representative of candidate Mondlane at around 01:00h at the CNE on 24 October.

¹³⁵ The seven CNE members declared that they had voted against the approval of the provisional election results as set out in the Minutes and Notice of the National Count, and against the CNE resolution in its entirety.

Recommendation: Review the results management system to ensure an efficient, uniform, consistent and transparent process, including: a quick system to announce provisional progressive results broken down by PS; and unambiguous procedures for rectifying errors and discrepancies in results protocol with clear criteria for the recounts of ballots.

RESULTS AND POST-ELECTION ENVIRONMENT

The failure to publish polling station results undermined the transparency and credibility of the results process.

Both the CNE and the CC failed to carry out adequate procedures that would have increased transparency and trust in the electoral results. The CNE claimed that it did not have the capacity to cross check the veracity of polling sheets, while the CC acknowledged major irregularities but refused to carry out recounts.

According to the final results announced by the CC on 23 December 2024¹³⁶ (more than two months after election day), FRELIMO won the presidential, the legislative elections and a majority of the provincial assembly seats, as well as all 10 provincial governors. Results were published by the CC on its website, however a granular and complete breakdown of result by district and province for all three elections was not included. While national and provincial assembly elections only include the number of seats gained by each party, numbers on blank and invalid ballots were included for the presidential and provincial assembly elections only. Provincial governor results include the FRELIMO number of votes and percentages, including the proclamation of the respective heads of lists as winners.

The election results validated by the CC substantially altered the provisional results published by the CNE: presidential candidate Daniel Chapo received 65.17 per cent of the vote (provisional results were 70.67 per cent), Venâncio Mondlane received 24.19 per cent (provisional results were 20.32 per cent), while Ossufo Momade received 6.62 per cent and Lutero Simango 4.02 per cent (provisional results were 5.81 and 3.21 per cent respectively).

Furthermore, the CC decided to decrease the 195 parliamentary seats attributed by the CNE in its provisional count to the FRELIMO party to 171 seats (24 fewer seats)¹³⁷, to increase the number of PODEMOS seats from 31 to 43¹³⁸, increase RENAMO seats from 20 to 28¹³⁹, and MDM seats from 4 to 8 seats¹⁴⁰. As such, FRELIMO would not have a three-quarters majority in the Assembly anymore, but only a two-thirds majority. PODEMOS received the strongest support in Nampula and Maputo province. Provisional CNE results gave Frelimo all 18 seats in Gaza, but the final validation attributed 2 of those seats to PODEMOS. MDM received its strongest vote in Sofala and Nampula, and RENAMO in Zambézia and Nampula.

¹³⁶ Constitutional Council Decision 24/CC/2024, 22 December 2024.

¹³⁷ CCs validation decreased 3 seats in Nampula, 5 seats in Zambézia, 5 seats in Tete, one seat in Manica, Sofala, Inhambane, 2 seats in Gaza and Maputo City, and 4 seats in Maputo Province. Niassa, Cabo Delgado and the diaspora seat attribution suffered no change.

CCs validation increased a total of 12 seats for PODEMOS: Nampula 1 seat; Zambézia 2 seats; Tete 3 seats; Gaza 2 seats; Maputo Province 3 seats; Maputo City 1 seat;

¹³⁹ CCs validation increased a total of 8 seats to RENAMO: Nampula, Manica, Inhambane and Maputo Province one seat each; Zambézia and Tete 2 seats each;

¹⁴⁰ CCs validation increased a total of 4 seats to MDM: Nampula, Zambézia, Sofala and Maputo City one seat each;

In the provincial assembly elections FRELIMO obtained 624 seats out of a total of 867 seats (71.9 per cent). RENAMO obtained 97 seats, PODEMOS 67 and MDM 58 seats¹⁴¹. All Provincial Governors were elected from the ruling party.

Mondlane received the most opposition votes in all provinces, in both urban and rural districts, while PODEMOS was the second most voted party in all provinces, except for Zambézia, Sofala, and Inhambane. The ascent of PODEMOS to become the leading party of the opposition occurred in less than two months, following the announcement of its formal support to the independent presidential candidate Mondlane on 21 August 2024¹⁴². According to most interlocutors, RENAMO and Momade were defeated in most provinces for having failed to challenge the government and to embrace a generational change¹⁴³. MDM achieved its best result in the provincial and legislative elections in Sofala, where it was the second most voted party, compared to being the fourth most voted party in all other provinces.

Official voter participation figures of the presidential and legislative elections were respectively 42.16 and 42.2 per cent, the second lowest participation after the 2004 elections. The constituency with most voters, Nampula province, registered the lowest participation rate, 28 per cent in the presidential race¹⁴⁴.

Invalid and blank votes accounted for an average of 2.8 per cent and 3.5 per cent for the presidential election, (and according to CNE provisional results 3.7 per cent and 5.2 per cent for the legislative election respectively¹⁴⁵). Low turnout may be explained by the lack of trust in the EMB, registration challenges in provinces of Nampula, Zambézia, Sofala and Cabo Delgado, and the reported collection of votercards in most provinces. RENAMO CNE vice-president referred to a “*cosmetic high percentage of abstention, which was intentionally created*”.

Provisional Results

After the CNE’s deliberation that approved the national centralisation of results¹⁴⁶, the CNE president announced the results of the general and provincial assembly elections and the corresponding distribution of mandates¹⁴⁷.

In its official minutes, the CNE, in addition to rejecting the three complaints lodged by RENAMO, MDM and PODEMOS, explained that it lacked both the operational capacity to investigate and

¹⁴¹ *Revolução Democrática* (RD) obtained 6 seats, *Partido Humanitário de Moçambique* (PAHUMO) 8 seats, *Partido de Reconciliação Nacional* (PARENA) 5 seats, and PARESO 2 seats. FRELIMO, RENAMO and MDM run candidates in all provincial assemblies.

¹⁴² In the 2019 elections, newly established PODEMOS party came seventh with 0.11 per cent of valid votes.

¹⁴³ The decline of the historical opposition party ended the traditional biparty political landscape constituted by FRELIMO and RENAMO for the last 30 years and eroded the relevance of regional voting preferences.

¹⁴⁴ Reference to CNE provisional election results.

¹⁴⁵ The province of Maputo and the city of Maputo showed highest turn out with 64.1 and 63.0 per cent while the province of Nampula and Niassa the lowest, respectively with 28.4 and 32.9 per cent. For the presidential elections, the number of invalid votes ranged from 2.4 per cent (Maputo Province) to 4.8 per cent (Sofala) and the number of blank votes from 1.7 per cent (Maputo and Gaza) to 7.4 per cent (Cabo Delgado). For the National Assembly elections, the number of invalid votes ranged from 1.9 per cent (Maputo City) to 6 per cent (Cabo Delgado) and the number of blank votes from 2.1 per cent (Maputo City) to 12.5 per cent (Cabo Delgado).

¹⁴⁶ The provisional results were not published progressively by district or by PS, but published only at provincial level, during a public event held on 24 October.

¹⁴⁷ These results were consistent with the data presented the previous day during the national tabulation process.

the time to consider recounts in PS where voter numbers differed across the three elections, or to reclassify invalid votes that may have favoured opposition parties¹⁴⁸. In this regard, the CNE's decision was not well-founded, as the law allows for a period of 15 days following the election to pass before the provisional results are announced. This timeframe seems sufficient to enable the necessary investigations, requests for recounts, verification and reclassification of invalid votes to be conducted.

The EU EOM noted that the STAE consolidated election results by collecting both copies of PS results sheets (*editais*) and district tabulation tables (*mapa de apuramento distrital*), the latter showing results by PS. The law does not require the latter document to be published. The STAE informed the EU EOM that it was technically possible to publish disaggregated results by PS. However, according to the CNE president, there is no legal prerequisite for this¹⁴⁹.

The EMB published the results through social media (WhatsApp) but did not use its website or Facebook account¹⁵⁰. General tabulation reports for each election, distributed to stakeholders present at the event, were dated the 20 October, three days before the national tabulation process took place at the CNE in presence of electoral stakeholders.

All opposition parties, the Bar Association, the Catholic Church, a CNE vice-president and civil society denounced the deliberate irregularities, altered results and potential fraud perpetrated by the CNE and the STAE, resulting in a lack of electoral justice reflecting the will of the voters.

Constitutional Council Validation of Election

According to the CC declaration of 23 december it “...*firmly believes that the irregularities found during the electoral process did not substantially influence the results of the General Elections (Presidential and Legislative) and the Provincial Assemblies throughout the country and the diaspora.*”

The CC modified the provisional CNE results, yet notwithstanding the CC's explanation of the method used to validate results sheets, its legal basis was unclear, which had a negative impact on the predictability of its decisions. Failing to disclose its validation process for each results sheet in detail exacerbated the already pervasive lack of confidence among stakeholders in the CC, gave rise to concerns regarding its capacity to effectively adjudicate electoral disputes, failed to restore electoral integrity and did not prevent further post-electoral conflict. Opposition parties did not accept the official election results.

Recommendation: The process by which the Constitutional Council validates results to be detailed and with specific references to the normative provisions and criteria used to ground the decision.

¹⁴⁸ Following a four-hour announcement, the CNE vice-president (RENAMO) criticised his colleagues in the media calling them “incompetent” and accusing FRELIMO of using the election to “*legitimise and perpetuate its power*” claiming a lack of electoral justice.

¹⁴⁹ The EU EOM called for the publication of polling station results in EU EOM statements and in meetings with the electoral authorities, political parties and civil society.

¹⁵⁰ Civil society participated to the publication of the results with live posts from among others: *Sala da Paz, Decide,* and *More Transparency*, the latter being a digital platform emerging in the electoral process on 1 October.

The CC validation decision nr. 24/CC/2024 partially annulled the CNE provisional results decision nr. 105/CNE/2024 in seven provinces where discrepancies of the vote between the three elections occurred - Maputo City, and the provinces of Maputo, Gaza, Inhambane, Tete, Zambézia and Nampula. Election results for the provinces of Manica, Sofala, Cabo Delgado e Niassa were certified by the CC based on the results sheets provided by the political parties.

The CNE decision nr.105 included the Public Prosecutor's Offices' opinion on the legality of the CNE conduct of the process stating it was clear that the CNE failed to fulfil its responsibilities of guiding, supervising and overseeing the electoral process. It reiterated the need for in-depth analysis by the legislator of the composition and functioning of the CNE with a view to transforming it into a professional body to guarantee its independence and impartiality.

Appeals lodged with the CC against CNE's provisional results presented by PODEMOS, RENAMO, MDM and *Partido Humanitário de Moçambique* (PAHUMO) were analysed during the validation phase¹⁵¹. Parties claimed, among other, against the discrepancies of the provisional results. CNE's explanation, that mistakes in the filling out of results sheets at polling stations could have produced incongruent results at district tabulation when results sheets were summed up, were rejected by the Public Prosecutors Office and by the CC for being inconsistent and for lacking technical or legal basis. The CC further established that during the validation process, the discrepancies in the results between the three elections originated in the district tabulation, where results had been inflated. Zambézia and Inhambane provinces registered significant discrepancies with 81,673 and 74,109 votes of difference between legislative and provincial elections, respectively¹⁵².

In order to analyse and validate the results, the CC opted to verify and compare the results sheets produced by the CDEs at district tabulation and delivered by the CNE against the copies held by political parties and four domestic observation groups¹⁵³. Two observation groups - *Mais Integridade* and *Decide*, refused to deliver their copies claiming that result sheets had been fabricated and could not be trusted to reflect the genuine vote. The results sheets presented by PODEMOS, as proof to its claims that its presidential candidate was placed first in the polls, was discarded by the CC with the argument that the data was inflated. The CC could order a recount of ballot papers if deemed necessary but decided it was not required¹⁵⁴.

According to the Mozambican Bar Association (OAM) "*this process did not follow the legal criterion for the validation of documents presented as proof and concluded that the comparison of results sheets was illegal.*" The OAM further suggested that a public hearing with party agents,

¹⁵¹ Appeals against provisional election results must be adjudicated by the CC within five days. The CC decided to extend the legal deadline and review the appeals during the validation phase seemingly as it needed more time to analyse the claims presented.

¹⁵² The CC further determined that those instances where party agents did not observe and therefore did not have the opportunity to present protests during counting and tabulation at polling stations and at district level - either because illegal acts prevented them from being accredited or because they were allegedly expelled - did not impact the transparency of the electoral process as other legal guarantees were respected.

¹⁵³ The CC explained the method applied to validate the results which consisted in comparing the results sheets submitted by the contestants and by the CNE: if the result sheets of two competing parties coincided, but diverged from those of the CNE, the CC validated them. If all the result sheets from the parties and the CNE diverged from each other, the results sheets of the CNE were validated.

¹⁵⁴ The Law for the Election of the President nr.15/2024, articles 196 and 196 A, stipulate that the Constitutional Council may order the annulment of the elections, and that the CC or the CNE may order a recount of the ballot.

media and observers would be the best way to analyse and produce legal proof as stipulated in the Civil Processual Code and also supported by article 14/1 of the ICCPR. In a statement issued by the OAM on 13 December on the validation process, it suggests the CC to either order a recount or proceed to annul the election in order to restore the electoral truth.

Furthermore, the CC, in its validation, makes reference to a 2023 ruling recommending that electoral crimes should be expeditiously adjudicated and accorded precedence over other proceedings, so that decisions made at the time of validation of results could be taken into account and their influence on the electoral result analysed. However, the CC validation decision does not refer to any instance in which decisions on electoral crimes were taken into account in its evaluation of the impact of electoral irregularities in the 2024 general elections process.

The CNE provisional and CC final results of the presidential election along with the distribution of seats in the National Assembly and the Provincial Assemblies are provided in Annex 1.

Complaints Relating to the Election Results

PODEMOS, RENAMO, MDM and PAHUMO filed petitions with the CC challenging the national election results announced by the CNE on 24 October and requested, among other, the repetition of national tabulation, based on the review of districts and city results sheets, and on the provincial results tabulation data with parties submitting copies of their tally sheets and their parallel voting tabulation as proof.

PODEMOS petitioned the annulment of elections in those districts where it was obstructed to supervise the polling or the district tabulation; it requested the annulment of elections in districts where the number of voters between the different elections did not coincide, as this could indicate multiple voting or ballot stuffing. Further, the party requested the CNE to provide results sheets and tabulation protocols used for the national tabulation, and to compare them with those in possession of PODEMOS and its Presidential candidate Mondlane and their own parallel vote tabulation¹⁵⁵. RENAMO claimed fundamental rights were violated and denounced ballot stuffing, false result sheets, manipulation of election results and discrepancies between district tally sheets and PS results. It requested a recount of the ballot, examination of blank and null votes, and the review of the provisional AR and AP mandates. MDM demanded an audit of the ballot papers or the repetition of the election as allegedly severe irregularities occurred, including during tabulation, that abnormally affected the results obtained by the party. PAHUMO requested the review of distribution of mandates regarding the provincial assembly of Cabo Delgado.

Upon the announcement of national provisional results, the CNE President stated the election commission was aware of several anomalies, including the disparity between the number of voters of the three elections, the low voter turn-out in all electoral districts and the high number of blank and invalid ballots¹⁵⁶.

On 20 October the CC ordered the CNE to present tally sheets and minutes from PS and district tabulation from the provinces of Maputo, Gaza, Inhambane, Tete, Zambézia, Nampula and Maputo

¹⁵⁵ [PODEMOS appeal to the CC against CNE's national tabulation results, 27 October 2024 \(in Portuguese language\)](#).

¹⁵⁶ He further stated that, due to the 15 days deadline to announce the national election results, the CNE was not able to conduct proper investigations into the irregularities. This statement was criticised by several stakeholders, including the Bar Association, which argued that the CNE should not announce results until irregularities were clarified.

City possibly with the aim to be in possession of original results sheets to verify the election results against the challenges made by the parties¹⁵⁷.

The timeframes for filing a challenge against results are short. Filing with district courts must be made within 48 hours after results are published, and a ruling issued also within 48 hours. An appeal to the CC may be filed within three days of receipt of notification, and a decision should be rendered within five days. According to CC jurisprudence the five-day deadline may in fact be extended to 15 days, following stipulations of its organic law on procedures for handling complaints and appeals. Following the adjudication of appeals the CC proceeds to validate the election results for which there is no deadline¹⁵⁸.

Post-election developments

While the campaign period and election day had been relatively calm, the post electoral period saw large amounts of violence and protests. Nine days after the poll (19 October), the legal adviser of presidential candidate Mondlane, Elvino Dias and the Spokesperson of PODEMOS, Paulo Guambe, were assassinated in the centre of Maputo by unidentified armed men. The assassination of these key advisors was believed by many interlocutors to be an attempt to silence and weaken Mondlane and PODEMOS ahead of the announcement of provisional results and to disrupt their efforts to use effectively legal mechanisms to challenge the election results¹⁵⁹. In a press statement issued on 19 October the EU EOM Chief Observer Laura Ballarín Cereza strongly supported the HRVP Josep Borrell's statement condemning the double assassination¹⁶⁰.

All opposition party leaders rejected the provisional and final results, including in a first press conference by a united opposition front on 30 October and called for street protests for electoral justice. They requested the publication of the results sheets, their verification through a forensic audit and appealed to the CC to restore the legality of the elections or to annul the poll. They held the electoral authorities, the police and FRELIMO responsible for the post-electoral violence. Chapo expressed openness to dialogue after the proclamation of results by the CC. Mondlane also expressed openness for dialogue but specified his conditions: publication of the results sheets of all PS by FRELIMO and the CNE, depolitisation of the State, fiscal decentralisation, employment, housing and projects for the youth, release of detained protesters, decent funerals for the killed protesters and compensation for their families.

In the appeal submitted to the CC, Mondlane claimed to be the winner of the presidential elections with 53 per cent of the votes (instead of the official 20 per cent) and PODEMOS to be allocated 138 seats in the Parliament out of 250 (instead of the official 31 seats allocated). MDM declared to have 23 seats in the Parliament instead of the officially allocated 4 seats. RENAMO claimed to be the most voted party in the provincial election in Zambézia .

In the days following the CC's request to the CNE to present the results sheets of seven provinces¹⁶¹, MDM, PODEMOS and RENAMO representatives informed the EU EOM that they

¹⁵⁷ The CNE was given eight days to collect the documentation and forward it to the CC.

¹⁵⁸ Despite the absence of an explicit legal provision regarding a deadline, specific articles in the Constitution compel the CC to proclaim results within a given timeframe.

¹⁵⁹ International and regional organisations, foreign states, political actors and candidates, the civil society and the Catholic Church and professional organisations condemned the brutal killings in the strongest terms.

¹⁶⁰ [HRVP Josep Borell's Statement.pdf](#)

¹⁶¹ Maputo City, and the Provinces of Maputo, Gaza, Inhambane, Tete, Zambezia and Nampula.

had been contacted by members of the election administration in order to sign results sheets. Such direct confirmation by major opposition parties suggested possible further manipulation of the electoral processes after election day.

The general national strikes and nationwide protests called periodically by Mondlane since October, were widely followed throughout all provinces and resulted in roadblocks and violent incidents between the security forces and the supporters of the opposition¹⁶². Police used heavy-handed tactics to disperse the protests using live ammunition and tear gas on unarmed civilians, journalists, and the civil society with few instances of violence against the police from protesters. Restrictions to freedom of peaceful assembly and violent dispersal of protests were reported by the media in all provinces¹⁶³. Several FRELIMO offices were set on fire¹⁶⁴ and dozens commercial establishments were vandalised. MISA denounced the deliberate restriction on the use of mobile data and social media platforms during the post-election phase.

The repression of the protests was particularly violent after the announcement of the final results on December 23. According to the Electoral Platform *Decide* as of mid January, some 314 people had been killed in the protests by firearm, around 633 people injured by firearm, and more than 4,236 arrested by the police¹⁶⁵. The EU EOM¹⁶⁶, the EU, Amnesty International and other international and local actors condemned the police violence used against demonstrators. On account of this climate of fear, Mondlane was forced to leave the country and only returned in January days before the inauguration of Daniel Chapo as President.

¹⁶² During the presence of the EU EOM in country, a national strike and street protests were called for 21, 24, 25 October and for the weeklong period from 31 October to 7 November.

¹⁶³ Maputo City, Matola, Boane (Maputo Province), Xai-Xai (Gaza), Inhassoro (Inhambane), Chimoio, Gondola and Inchope (Manica), Beira (Sofala), Tete and Moatize (Tete), Gilé (Zambezia), Nampula and Nacala (Nampula), Montepuez and Namuno (Cabo Delgado), Mecanhelas (Niassa) with barricades and burning tyres along the main roads, dispersed by tear gas and often live bullets.

¹⁶⁴ Including in Chimoio, Gondola and Inchope (Manica), in Chalaua (Nampula), in Maxaquene (Maputo), Gilé and Pebane (Zambezia).

¹⁶⁵ <https://www.voaportugues.com/a/líder-da-oposição-moçambicana-diz-que-a-polícia-está-a-fomentar-a-agitação-pós-eleitoral/7914565.html>

¹⁶⁶ [EU EOM Mozambique's second post-election press statement | EEAS.](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eu-external-operations/eu-election-observation-mission-mozambique/post-election-press-statement-3)

[https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eu-external-operations/eu-election-observation-mission-mozambique/post-election-press-statement-3.pdf](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eu-external-operations/eu-election-observation-mission-mozambique/post-election-press-statement-3)

RECOMMENDATIONS

NO.	FR page #	CONTEXT	RECOMMENDATION	SUGGESTED CHANGE IN LEGAL FRAMEWORK	RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTION	RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLE / COMMITMENT
LEGAL FRAMEWORK						
1	14	Despite the legislative changes, the legal framework remained imprecise and complex. Due to the content and impact of the changes in the electoral process, combined by their late approval, the amendments were contrary to legal certainty.	<i>Review and harmonise electoral laws to grant legal certainty and remove contradictions.</i>	Election Law	Assembly of the Republic	<p style="text-align: center;">Rule of Law</p> <p>UN Human Rights Council Resolution 19/36 (A/HRC/RES/19/36, 2012) p.16 (The Human Rights Council)</p> <p><i>” calls upon States to make continues efforts to strengthen the rule of law and promote democracy by:</i></p> <p><i>c)Ensuring that a sufficient degree of legal certainty and predictability is provided in the application of the law”</i></p>

ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATION						
2	15	<p>Political actors and civil society remained highly critical of the election administration, including for its partisan affiliation and lack of professionalism, at national, provincial or district level to a degree these stakeholders described as unprecedented. The selection process of the commissioners undertaken by the Parliament was also criticised by civil society organisations.</p>	<p><i>Review the structure, composition and selection process of the election administration at all levels to enhance professionalism, accountability and impartiality throughout all stages of the electoral process.</i></p>	<p>Election Law</p>	<p>Assembly of the Republic</p>	<p>States must take necessary steps to give effect to rights</p> <p>Genuine elections that reflect the free expression of the will of the voters</p> <p>ICCPR, Article 2.2</p> <p>ICCPR, United Nations Human Rights Commission, General Comment No. 25, p. 20. “<i>An independent electoral authority should be established to supervise the electoral process and to ensure that it is conducted fairly, impartially and in accordance with established laws which are compatible with the Covenant.</i>”</p> <p>ACDEG, Art. 17(1): “<i>(...) strengthen independent and impartial national electoral bodies responsible for the management of elections</i>”.</p> <p>SADC Principles and Guidelines governing Democratic Elections, Art. 4.1.9: “<i>Uphold and guarantee the impartiality and independence of the judiciary, the EMB and all other electoral institutions</i>”. Art. 5.1.3:</p>

						<p><i>“Establish impartial, professional, independent, all inclusive, competent and accountable election management bodies staffed by eminent, non-partisan and capable commissioners and efficient professional personnel.”</i></p>
3	16	<p>The CNE was adversely affected by the delay in the disbursement of the approved electoral budget. Early September, the CNE received additional funds from the government, which, together with funds previously received, represented three quarters of its budgetary requirements for these polls. Hired staff who participated in the voter registration process or the voter education campaign had still to be paid when elections took place.</p>	<p><i>Provide the CNE with budgetary independence through timely and adequate access to the funds approved in the National General Budget.</i></p>	No legal change	Government Assembly of the Republic	<p>States Must Take Necessary Steps to Give Effect to Rights</p> <p>UNGA Resolution A/RES/68/164: <i>“The GA notes the importance of adequate resources for the administration of efficient and transparent elections at the national and local levels and recommends that Member States provide adequate resources for those elections”.</i></p> <p>SADC PF Norms and Standards for Elections in the SADC Region, part 2 (5) (iii): <i>“To further enhance the independence and impartiality of the Electoral Commission it should have its own budget directly voted for by Parliament and not get its allocation from a Ministry or a Government Department.”</i></p> <p>SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections – Art. 5.1.5: <i>“Ensure that the electoral management body, or other legally designated institution,</i></p>

						is independent and that has adequate (...) financial resources and contingencies made available for the entire electoral cycle (...) “.
4	16	The CNE’s public communication lacked planning, strategy, and outreach. The content and frequency of CNE updates did not meet the need for public information. Information sharing consisted of irregular meetings with political parties and the organisation of very few press conferences or media interviews.	<i>CNE to establish an effective institutional communication strategy to enhance the transparency and accountability of the electoral process, develop measures to build public confidence and ensure the prompt publication of decisions and results.</i>	No legal change	National Election Commission	<p>Transparency and Access to Information / Right and Opportunity to Participate in Public Affairs</p> <p>ICCPR GC 34 para. 19: “States parties should proactively put in the public domain Government information of public interest. States parties should make every effort to ensure easy, prompt, effective and practical access to such information.”</p> <p>UN Convention Against Corruption, Art. 10(a): ‘Adopting procedures or regulations allowing members of the general public to obtain, where appropriate, information on the organization, functioning and decision-making processes of its public administration and (...) on decisions and legal acts that concern members of the public.’</p> <p>SADC PF Norms and Standards for Elections in the SADC Region, part 3(8): “The following good</p>

						<p><i>practices are offered for adoption by Electoral Commissions in our Region: (i) periodic meetings with representatives of the media at every important stage of the electoral process as a way of communicating with the general public; and (ii) general media briefings and general statements to the media to avoid misrepresentation.”</i></p>
5	17	<p>The training process was marked by a lack of information for the training staff about their contractual conditions, the absence of proclamations at the time of application indicating that candidates are not affiliated to a political party; and the conditions for allocating posts and polling stations. The STAE cancelled the recruitment process of polling trainers in the district of Quelimane (Zambézia) after RENAMO submitted a complaint as the list contained civil servants affiliated to FRELIMO. Civil society reported similar cases of hiring of politically oriented civil servants.</p>	<p><i>Enhance the integrity of electoral process by selecting independent and impartial polling station members. Their roles should be protected from arbitrary assignments.</i></p>	Election Law	National Election Commission Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration	<p>State Must Take the Necessary Steps to Give Effect to Rights</p> <p>UN CAC, Art. 7.1.b: <i>“Each State Party shall endeavour to adopt, maintain and strengthen systems for the recruitment, hiring, retention, promotion and retirement of civil servants: That include adequate procedures for the selection and training of individuals for public positions (...).”</i></p> <p>ACDEG, Art. 17(1)</p> <p>OAU/AU Declaration on The Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa, Art. 4: <i>“Democratic elections should be conducted: e) by (...) competent accountable electoral institutions staff by well-trained personnel.</i></p>
VOTER REGISTRATION						

6	19	<p>There was a notable lack of confidence in the reliability of the electoral register, given the discrepancies between the population projections of the National Institute of Statistics (INE) and the electoral register, in a context where a new voter registry is produced for each election, which partly explained the high cost of elections, and where the election administration did not publish any post-voter registration process' report.</p>	<p><i>Establish and maintain a reliable and cost-effective mechanisms to update the voter register, for example by using other existing and reliable data sources, such as the civil registry.</i></p>	<p>Voter Registration Law</p>	<p>Assembly of the Republic</p>	<p>Right and Opportunity to Vote / States must take Necessary Steps to Give Effect to Rights</p> <p>ICCPR, United Nations Human Rights Commission, GC 25 “States must take effective measures to ensure that all persons entitled to vote are able to exercise that right...”.</p> <p>SADC PF Norms and Standards for Elections in the SADC Region, part 1 (1) (ii): “There should be provisions and practical arrangements for continuous voter registration and an updated voters’ register must be made available to all stakeholders in the elections.”</p> <p>Declaration on Criteria for Free and Fair Elections (IPU), s.4, “Establish an effective (...) procedure for the registration of voters”.</p>
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK						
7	10	<p>The rights to peaceful assembly, equal treatment, the security of the person and access to information were gravely disrespected in the post-electoral period with violent repression by the police of protests against the election results in all provinces of the country. The exercise of political rights of voters and</p>	<p><i>State authorities to protect fundamental freedoms, namely the right to freedom of assembly, access to information, and the conduct of peaceful manifestation and campaign activities in a safe environment, free from intimidation and violent acts against party members,</i></p>		<p>Assembly of the Republic Police Forces Government</p>	<p>Freedom of Assembly / Right to Security of the Person</p> <p>SADC PF Norms and Standards for Elections in the SADC Region, part 3 (5): “all Government Security Forces should act impartially and professionally;(…).</p>

		<p>contestants were also undermined during the election process. EU observers reported a climate of fear due to political harassment, intimidation and coercion by the ruling party.</p> <p>Opposition leaders accused the police for the assassination of key opposition figures in Maputo by unidentified armed men.</p> <p>MISA denounced the deliberate restriction on the use of Internet and social media platforms during the days of the protests.</p>	<i>supporters and journalists.</i>			<p>ACDEG, Art. 4: “<i>State Parties shall commit themselves to promote democracy, the principle of the rule of law and human rights.</i>” Art. 14: “<i>State Parties shall strengthen and institutionalize constitutional civilian control over the armed and security forces to ensure the consolidation of democracy and constitutional order.</i>”</p> <p>ICCPR, UN Human Rights Commission, GC 25 p.19: “<i>...Voters should be able to form opinions independently, free of violence or threat of violence, compulsion, inducement or manipulative interference of any kind.</i>”</p>
8	36	<p>Although cases of electoral offences are dealt with by the courts, the CNE failed to take responsibility for the integrity of the electoral process by not addressing the impact of the electoral offences on the election results.</p>	<i>The National Election Commission to take full responsibility for the integrity of the electoral process, by adopting measures to address the consequences of electoral offences and malpractices during voting, counting and tabulation of results to diminish their impact on the election results.</i>	Election Law	Assembly of the Republic	<p>Genuine Elections that Reflect the Free Expression of the Will of Voters / Right to Effective Remedy</p> <p>ICCPR GC 25, p.20</p> <p>AU Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa 2002,Art.4</p> <p>ICCPR art. 2 (3)</p>
CAMPAIGN ENVIRONMENT						
9	22	<p>EU observers and interlocutors reported an evident tilting of the</p>	<i>Enforce the existing prohibition on the misuse of state resources.</i>	No change	Attorney General	<p>Rule of Law/ Prevention of</p>

		playing field in favour of the ruling party. FRELIMO benefited from the advantages of incumbency through the misuse of state resources. Summoning of civil servants and teachers to participate in FRELIMO’s campaign activities was reported by EU observers and interlocutors in all provinces, except Maputo City, Gaza, and Manica.			Judiciary Political Parties Government Local Administration	Corruption/Fairness in the Election Campaign SADC PF Norms and Standards for Elections in the SADC Region, part 2 (3): <i>“In the interest of creating conditions for a level playing field for all political parties and promoting the integrity of the electoral process, parties should not use public funds in the electoral process. The electoral law should prohibit the Government to aid or to abet any party gaining unfair advantage.”</i>
CAMPAIGN FINANCE						
10	23	The law is permissive regarding the sources of private campaign funding and does not define ceilings on campaign spending. Oversight measures in relation to private funding and expenses incurred during campaigning are weak, which enables possible illicit funding by organised crime networks according to interlocutors. Although the law requires political parties to declare the private contributions received, competent authorities do not receive	<i>Strengthen the legal framework and oversight for private campaign finance from private sources. Measures could include accountability mechanisms to reduce the opportunities for illicit financing, and reasonable expenditure limitations to ensure equal opportunity and transparency.</i>	Election Law Law of Political Parties	Assembly of the Republic Government	Prevention of Corruption / Fairness in the Election Campaign AU Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, Art. 10: <i>“Each State Party shall adopt legislative and other measures which proscribe the use of funds acquired through illegal and corrupt practices to finance political parties; and incorporate the principle of transparency into funding of political parties.”</i>

		such declarations on a regular basis.				ICCPR, UN Human Rights Commission, GC 25, para. 19: “Reasonable limitations on campaign expenditure may be justified where this is necessary to ensure that the free choice of voters is not undermined or the democratic process distorted by the disproportionate expenditure on behalf of any candidate or party.” CAC
MEDIA						
11	25	The media sector suffers from a lack of an independent regulatory and licensing structure with safeguards against undue government intervention.	<i>Ensure the independence of the Superior Council of Social Communication with the legal status of an independent administrative entity, and protected from government interference.</i>	Constitution	Assembly of the Republic	Freedom of Expression Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa, Article VII: “(1) Any public authority exercising powers in the areas of broadcasting or telecommunications regulation must be independent and adequately protected against interference, particularly of a political or economic nature. (2) The process of appointing members of a regulatory body must be open and transparent, involving the participation of civil society; it must not be controlled by any political party. (3) Any public authority exercising powers in

						<p><i>broadcasting or telecommunications must be formally accountable to the public through a multiparty body.”</i></p> <p>ICCPR, UN Human Rights Committee, GC No. 25, p. 23: <i>“Basing access to public service on equal opportunity and merit, while providing job security, ensures that public officials are free from political interference and pressures.”</i></p> <p>ICCPR GC 34, paragraph 39</p>
12	24	<p>Unjustified restrictions on access to information and press freedom can still be found in parts of the legislation, such as Law 12/1979 establishing the legal regime for the protection of State Secrecy, the Press Law 18/91, which denies journalists immunity from criminal liability for defamation when the offended party is the President, even if there is evidence supporting the alleged facts, and the Council of Ministers Decree 40/2018.</p>	<p><i>Eliminate provisions limiting freedom of expression and the press, in particular abolishing decriminalisation of defamation.</i></p>	<p>Press Law Penal Code</p>	<p>Assembly of the Republic</p>	<p>Right to Access Public Information</p> <p>ICCPR, UN Human Rights Committee, GC No. 34, p. 47: <i>“States should consider the decriminalization of defamation, and in any event, the application of criminal law should only be considered in the most serious cases, and imprisonment is never an appropriate penalty.”</i></p> <p>Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa, Article XII: (1) <i>“States shall ensure that their laws relating to defamation conform to the following standards: No one shall be held liable for true statements, opinions, or</i></p>

						<p><i>statements about public figures that, under the circumstances, were deemed reasonable; public figures are required to tolerate greater criticism; sanctions should never be so severe as to inhibit the dissemination of information of public interest.”</i></p> <p>ICCPR, UN Human Rights Committee, GC No. 25, p. 25: “...the free communication of information and ideas on public and political issues between citizens, candidates, and elected representatives. This implies the existence of a free press and other media capable of commenting on public issues without censorship or limitations and of informing public opinion.”</p>
SOCIAL MEDIA AND DIGITAL RIGHTS						
13	29	<p>Despite provisions in the Constitution (article 71) on the need to legislate on the access, generation, protection and use of computerised personal data, no specific legislation on data protection or privacy has yet been passed.</p>	<p><i>Elaborate and approve laws on data protection and cybersecurity according to existing international standards to guarantee citizens’ privacy, including during elections.</i></p>		<p>Assembly of the Republic</p>	<p>Right to Privacy and Data Protection</p> <p>ICCPR, Art. 17: “1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation. 2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”</p> <p>ICCPR, HRC, General Comment</p>

						16, paragraph 10: <i>“The gathering and holding of personal information on computers, data banks and other devices, whether by public authorities or private individuals or bodies, must be regulated by law”.</i>
14	30	Disinformation was present during campaign and post-election periods, compromising the integrity of the process and the right to voters to receive accurate information.	<i>Stakeholders to take action to fight disinformation in the social media and strengthen fact-checking initiatives.</i>		<p>National Institute of Communication of Mozambique</p> <p>National Institute of Information and Communication Technologies</p> <p>Media Institute of Southern Africa</p> <p>MISA-Check</p> <p>Media Institutions</p> <p>National Election Commission</p> <p>Civil Society Organisations</p>	<p>Freedom of Expression/ Right to Information</p> <p>GC ICCPR No. 25, para. 19: <i>“Persons entitled to vote shall be able to form an independent opinion, free from violence, threat of violence, pressure or manipulation of any kind”.</i></p> <p>UN/OAS/OSCE Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and Elections in the Digital Age: 1.C.i: <i>“States should consider supporting positive measures to address the problem of online disinformation, such as the promotion of independent information verification and public education campaigns, while avoiding adopting legislation to criminalise the dissemination of disinformation”.</i></p> <p>Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and ‘Fake News’, Disinformation and Propaganda of the UN, OSCE, OAS and ACHPR. Art. 3.e: <i>“States should take measures to promote digital and</i></p>

						media literacy (...). Art. 3.f: States should consider other measures to promote equality (...) including to address the negative effects of misinformation and propaganda. Art. 4.e: Intermediaries should support research and development of appropriate technological solutions to disinformation and propaganda (...). They should cooperate with initiatives that offer fact-checking services to users”.
VOTING, COUNTING AND TABULATION						
15	40	The EOM observed that the voting process was characterised by a number of procedural deficiencies that have the potential to negatively impact the integrity and credibility of the electoral process. Some of these shortcomings were attributable to the existence of superfluous and/or time-consuming procedures, the ineffective implementation of procedures, and a lack of procedures that guarantee integrity safeguards in the electoral process.	<i>Review and ensure proper implementation of polling and counting procedures to enhance safeguards and improve the integrity and transparency of the process.</i>	Election Law	Assembly of the Republic STAE	Right and Opportunity to Vote ICCPR, HRC GC 25, par. 11: “States must take effective measures to ensure that all persons entitled to vote are able to exercise that right”. SADC PF Norms and Standards for Elections in the SADC Region, part 1 (2.i): “The right of eligible individuals to vote unimpeded and the right to vote in secrecy in a ballot box should be protected and enshrined in the constitutions of the SADC countries.”
16	43	In addition to be marked by a series of malpractices, the tabulation process was characterised by a notable lack of preparedness on the part of election officials to perform tabulation activities in an organised, systematic,	<i>Review the results management system to ensure an efficient, uniform, consistent and transparent process, including: a quick system to announce provisional progressive results</i>	Election Law	Assembly of the Republic	Genuine Elections that Reflect the Free Expression of the Will of Voters/ Transparency and the Right to Information

		<p>professional and timely manner.</p> <p>The electoral administration did not require the district tabulation centres to utilise a data entry process with uniform guarantees, thereby affording district election officials the opportunity to enter results that did not correspond to those of the polling stations, either voluntarily or involuntarily. The STAE conveyed to the EU EOM that the technical feasibility of publishing results broken down by polling station existed, despite the absence of legal obligation to do so within the framework of the CNE.</p>	<p><i>broken down by polling station; and unambiguous procedures for rectifying errors and discrepancies in results protocol with clear criteria for the recounts of ballots.</i></p>			<p>ICCPR, Articles 19.2 and 25.2</p> <p>ICCPR, United Nations Human Rights Commission, General Comment No. 25, p. 20. “An independent electoral authority should be established to supervise the electoral process and to ensure that it is conducted fairly, impartially and in accordance with established laws which are compatible with the Covenant.”</p>
ELECTION OBSERVATION AND PARTY AGENTS						
17	33	<p>National observers experienced difficulties in obtaining the necessary accreditation in Province of Zambezia, which resulted in delays to their deployment. The EU observers identified several organisations unknown to the national observer community who significantly increased the overall number of national observers.</p>	<p><i>Ensure systematic and timely accreditation by the National Election Commission of party representatives, observers and the media.</i></p>	Election Law	<p>Assembly of the Republic</p> <p>National Election Commission</p>	<p>Right and Opportunity to Participate in Public Affairs</p> <p>SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections 5.1.7 “Ensure timely accreditation of observers in accordance with national laws as appropriate”</p> <p>ACDEG, Art.19: “Each State Party shall guarantee conditions of security, free access to information, non-interference, freedom of movement and full cooperation with the electoral observer mission”.</p> <p>Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation, art.12b:</p>

						“Guarantees full access for international election observation missions to all stages of the electoral process and to all electoral technologies, including electronic technologies (...)”.
VALIDATION OF RESULTS						
18	46	The CC modified the provisional CNE results, yet notwithstanding the CC's explanation of the method used to validate results sheets, its legal basis was unclear, with a negative impact on the predictability of its decisions. Failing to disclose in detail its validation process for each results sheet exacerbated the already pervasive lack of confidence among stakeholders in the CC, gave rise to concerns regarding its capacity to effectively adjudicate electoral disputes, failed to restore electoral integrity and did not prevent further post-electoral conflict.	<i>The process by which the Constitutional Council validates results to be detailed and with specific references to the normative provisions and criteria used to ground the decision.</i>	Organisational Law of the Constitutional Council	Assembly of the Republic	<p>Right to Effective Remedy</p> <p>ICCPR Article 2 (3).</p> <p>“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:</p> <p>(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity;”</p>

ANNEX 1 – ELECTION RESULTS

**VALIDATION OF RESULTS BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL, DECISION N.º.
24/CC/2024, 22 DECEMBER 2024**

Presidential, Members of the National Assembly, Provincial Assemblies and Provincial Governor

Presidential Election	
Total Voters	7 238 027
Total Abstention	9 931 212
Total Valid Votes	6 777 113
Total Invalid Votes	205 601
Total Blank Votes	255 313

Candidate Name	Number of Votes	Percentage (%)
Lutero Chimbirombiro Lutero	272 736	4,02%
Daniel Francisco Chapo	4 416 306	65,17%
Venâncio António Bila Mondlane	1 639 333	24,19%
Ossufo Momade	448 738	6,62 %

Election for the National Assembly	
Total Registered	17 169 239
Total Voters	7 245 651
Total Abstention	9 923 588

Province	Political Party	Number of Mandates	Total number of Mandates
Niassa	Frelimo	11	13
	PODEMOS	1	
	Renamo	1	
Cabo Delgado	Frelimo	16	21
	PODEMOS	3	
	Renamo	2	
Nampula	MDM	3	48
	Frelimo	27	
	PODEMOS	11	
	Renamo	7	
Zambezia	MDM	1	42
	Frelimo	28	
	PODEMOS	5	

	Renamo	8	
Tete	Frelimo	16	23
	PODEMOS	4	
	Renamo	3	
Manica	Frelimo	12	16
	PODEMOS	2	
	Renamo	2	
Sofala	MDM	3	19
	Frelimo	13	
	PODEMOS	2	
	Renamo	1	
Inhambane	Frelimo	12	15
	PODEMOS	1	
	Renamo	2	
Gaza	Frelimo	16	18
	PODEMOS	2	
Maputo Province	Frelimo	13	23
	PODEMOS	9	
	Renamo	1	
Maputo City	MDM	1	10
	Frelimo	5	
	PODEMOS	3	
	Renamo	1	
Africa	Frelimo	1	1
Rest of the World	Frelimo	1	1

Elections for the Provincial Assembly	
Total Voters	6 636 97
Total Abstention	9 521 361
Total Valid Votes	6 094 019
Total Invalid Votes	174 705
Total Blank Votes	367 873

Province	Political Party	Number of Mandates	Total number of Mandates
Niassa	MDM	3	80
	Frelimo	60	
	Renamo	11	
	RD	6	
Cabo Delgado	MDM	5	85
	Frelimo	60	
	Renamo	12	
	PAHUMO	8	
Nampula	MDM	4	103
	Frelimo	63	
	PODEMOS	23	
	Renamo	13	
Zambezia	MDM	4	99
	Frelimo	63	
	PODEMOS	13	
	Renamo	19	
Tete	MDM	7	86
	Frelimo	69	
	Renamo	10	
Manica	MDM	5	82
	Frelimo	67	
	Renamo	10	
Sofala	MDM	15	83
	Frelimo	64	
	Renamo	4	
Inhambane	MDM	6	81
	Frelimo	63	
	Renamo	10	
	PARESO	2	
Gaza	MDM	6	82
	Frelimo	67	
	Renamo	4	
	PARENA	5	
Maputo Provincia	MDM	3	86

	Frelimo	48	
	PODEMOS	31	
	Renamo	4	

Elected governors by political party:

Province	Political Party	Valid Votes	Percentage (%)
Niassa	Frelimo	178 757	69,20 %
Cabo Delgado	Frelimo	247 672	61,54 %
Nampula	Frelimo	413 270	50,71 %
Zambezia	Frelimo	474 965	56,61 %
Tete	Frelimo	658 350	78,56 %
Manica	Frelimo	357 883	76,55 %
Sofala	Frelimo	403 391	66,02 %
Inhambane	Frelimo	268 514	70,45 %
Gaza	Frelimo	437 921	78,23 %
Maputo Province	Frelimo	461 257	49,88 %

Name of Province	Name of Head of List elected
Niassa	Elina Judite da Rosa Massengele
Cabo Delgado	Valige Tauabo
Nampula	Eduardo Mariano Abdula
Zambezia	Pio Augusto Matos
Tete	Domingos Juliasse Viola
Manica	Francisca Domingos Tomás
Sofala	Lourenço Ferreira Bulha
Inhambane	Francisco Manuel Pagula
Gaza	Margarida Sebastião Mapanzene Chongo
Maputo Province	Manuel Simão Nuvunga Tule

Source: Constitutional Council Decision 24/CC/2024, 22 December.

PRELIMINARY NATIONAL FINAL RESULTS¹⁶⁷

Preliminary final results of the Presidential election, Source CNE (incl. diaspora)

Registered Voters: 17,169,239, Voters: 7,464,822, Turnout: 43.48 %

¹⁶⁷ [Results uploaded online by the CIP.](#)

Presentation A: Preliminary final results of the Presidential election, Source CNE (incl. diaspora)

Candidates	Votes	Per cent
Daniel Chapo	4,912,762	70.67
Venâncio Mondlane	1,412,517	20.32
Ossufo Momade	403,591	5.81
Lutero Simango	223,066	3.21
Invalid Votes	239,039	3.20
Blank Votes	273,858	3.67

Presentation B: Preliminary final results of the Presidential election per electoral constituency, Source CNE (incl. diaspora)

Provinces	Registered voters / Votes	Total	Candidates			
			Lutero Simango	Daniel Chapo	Venâncio Mondlane	Ossufo Momade
			Votes %, #			
Cid. Maputo	Registered voters	676 757	2.86%	53.68%	33.84%	9.62%
	Votes	426 389	10 893	204 117	128 669	36 560
Maputo Prov.	Registered voters	1 569 530	2.45%	68.2%	27.4%	2.5%
	Votes	1 005 682	23 612	656 056	260 792	24 112
Gaza	Registered voters	1 198 262	2.33%	84.59%	11.47%	1.61%
	Votes	602 340	13 404	487 275	66 071	9 288
Inhambane	Registered voters	1 002 723	3.31%	73.16%	19.86%	3.68%
	Votes	433 219	13 577	300 298	81 525	15 094
Sofala	Registered voters	1 293 158	6.94%	65.54%	24.27%	3.25%
	Votes	670 870	42 937	405 481	150 187	20 114
Manica	Registered voters	1 128 189	2.64%	66.71%	24.65%	6%
	Votes	570 555	14 027	354 322	130 925	31 867
Tete	Registered voters	1 556 938	1.83%	84.42%	10.84%	2.91%
	Votes	922 956	15 923	733 281	94 116	25 299
Zambezia	Registered voters	2 863 308	3%	73%	14.17%	9.82%
	Votes	956 609	26 475	644 702	125 182	86 762
Nampula	Registered voters	3 266 882	3.67%	59.58%	25.59%	11.17%
	Votes	927 996	31 070	504 786	216 826	94 606
Cabo Delgado	Registered voters	1 407 467	3.99%	65.81%	22.64%	7.56%
	Votes	481 249	17 076	281 507	96 843	32 331
Niassa	Registered voters	872 186	3.59%	68.95%	18.51%	8.95%
	Votes	287 080	9 615	184 467	49 515	23 957
Africa	Registered voters	330 092	2.55%	89.16%	6.24%	2.5%
	Votes	177 762	4 442	155 426	10 877	3 580
Rest of the world	Registered voters	3 747	0.72%	50.46%	47.80%	1.01%
	Votes	2 115	15	1 044	989	21
Total Registered Voters		17 169 239	3.21%	70.67%	20.32%	5.81%
Total Votes		7 464 822	223 066	4 912 762	1 412 517	403 591

- Preliminary final results of the National Assembly elections, Source CNE (incl. diaspora)
Registered Voters: 17,169,239, Voters: Turnout: 43.89 %, Invalid Votes: 3.68%, Blank Votes: 5.08 %

Presentation A: Allocations of seats to the four parties to which seats have been allocated

Electoral Constituency	Allocation of Seats				
	FRELIMO	PODEMOS	RENAMO	MDM	Total
City of Maputo	7	2	1	0	10
Maputo	17	6	0	0	23
Gaza	18	0	0	0	18
Inhambane	13	1	1	0	15
Sofala	14	2	1	2	19
Manica	13	2	1	0	16
Tete	21	1	1	0	23
Zambezia	33	3	6	0	42
Nampula	30	10	6	2	48
Cabo Delgado	16	3	2	0	21
Niassa	11	1	1	0	13
Africa	1	0	0	0	1
Rest of the World	1	0	0	0	1
Total	195	31	20	4	250

Presentation B: Votes and allocations of seats to the four parties to which seats have been allocated

Provinces	Registered voters / Votes	Total	List of the four political parties to which seats have been allocated							
			FRELIMO		PODEMOS		RENAMO		MDM	
			Votes %, #	Seats	Votes %, #	Seats	Votes %, #	Seats	Votes %, #	Seats
City Maputo	Registered voters	676 757	57.78	7	20.53	2	12.62	1	6.34	0
	Votes	425 992	236 310		83 963		51 635		25 912	
Maputo	Registered voters	1 569 530	67.3	17	25.07	6	3.34	0	2.64	0
	Votes	974 391	614 860		229 931		30 678		24 247	
Gaza	Registered voters	1 198 262	87.40	18	4.44	0	2.80	0	2.12	0
	Votes	607 048	500 187		24 382		16 030		12 152	
Inhambane	Registered voters	1 002 723	78.35	13	7.58	1	6.45	1	2.78	0
	Votes	489 267	358 280		34 646		29 498		12 693	
Sofala	Registered voters	1 293 158	65.50	14	12.8	2	5.76	1	9.74	2
	Votes	671 387	394 289		77 057		34 685		58 645	
Manica	Registered voters	1 128 189	67.38	13	15.32	2	9.10	1	2.91	0
	Votes	569 443	341 636		77 681		46 122		14 764	
Tete	Registered voters	1 556 938	85.58	21	6.11	1	4.42	1	1.86	0
	Votes	912 621	721 699		51 516		37 304		15 666	
Zambezia	Registered voters	2 863 308	73.09	33	7.54	3	14.99	6	2.18	0
	Votes	1 011 622	676 203		69 728		138 685		20 208	
Nampula	Registered voters	3 266 882	57.93	30	19.4	10	12.96	6	3.81	2
	Votes	933 424	476 542		156 631		106 649		31 342	
Cabo Delgado	Registered voters	1 407 467	66.44	16	14.58	3	8.69	2	3.14	0
	Votes	478 470	259 304		56 898		33 907		12 263	
Niassa	Registered voters	872 186	68.99	11	10.28	1	10.45	1	3.8	0
	Votes	284 442	176 807		26 355		26 786		7 889	
Africa	Registered voters	330 092	90.00	1	-	0	3.26	0	2.54	0
	Votes	175 149	153 584		-		5 556		4 331	
Rest of the world	Registered voters	3 747	59.06	1	-	0	9.65	0	15.16	0
	Votes	2 088	1 157		-		189		297	
Total Registered Voters		17 169 239								
Total Votes		7 535 344	4 910 858	195		31	557 724	20	264 656	4

- Preliminary final results of the Provincial Assemblies elections, Source CNE

Electoral Constituency	Allocation of Seats								Total
	FRELIMO	RENAMO	PODEMOS	M D	R D	PAHUMO	PARENA	PARESO	
Maputo	62	2	20	2	0	0	0	0	86
Gaza	80	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	82
Inhambane	73	4	0	3	0	0	0	1	81
Sofala	68	3	0	12	0	0	0	0	83
Manica	70	8	0	4	0	0	0	0	82
Tete	81	3	0	2	0	0	0	0	86
Zambezia	83	12	4	0	0	0	0	0	99
Nampula	76	8	18	1	0	0	0	0	103
Cabo Delgado	72	7	0	1	0	5	0	0	85
Niassa	66	7	0	1	6	0	0	0	80
Total	731	54	42	27	6	5	1	1	867

ANNEX 2 – MEDIA MONITORING FINDINGS

Methodological note

From 10 September until 6 October, EU EOM Mozambique monitored a sample broadcast and print media with a standard quantitative and qualitative analysis of their election coverage. The media monitoring aimed at providing reliable data on the distribution of time and space given to each political contestant, thus verifying if the media guaranteed a sufficient level of information on the various political alternatives in a balanced and fair manner. The media outlets monitored by the EU EOM are the following:

N.º TV Channels (Private – State/Public): 1 public (TVM); 3 private (STV-SOICO, Sucesso TV, Miramar TV) – Time slot: 18h-24h.

N.º Radio stations: 1 - public Rádio de Moçambique – Time slot: 06h-10h.

N.º newspapers: 5 – *Notícias* (daily, public); *Domingo* (weekly, public) *Savana* (weekly, private), *Canal de Moçambique* (weekly, private), *Diário de Moçambique* (daily, private).

Main variables monitored (total airtime, party affiliation, actor, direct speech, tone, format, topic, gender, political party, type of election).


How to read the charts

- Charts show the distribution of airtime or space (in percentage) allotted to political parties, Government or President by each media outlet;
- The time is monitored in hh:mm:ss for the electronic media and space is measured in cm² for print media.

GENERAL ELECTIONS – TV

Televisão de Moçambique - TVM (public TV) - News coverage (total airtime)

10 September - 6 de October 2024, 18:00-24:00




Base: 47h29m39s Others (each with less than 1% - MONARUMO, ND, AMUSI, PARENA, PUN, PDM, PT, MPD, ADEMO, PAHUMO, PARESO, PAREDE, RJDM, PLD, PPPM, RD)

Created with Datawrapper

Political and electoral coverage by format - TV

10 September - 6 de October 2024, 18:00-24:00

Electoral debates Voter education News Editorial Programmes Political advertising
 Free airtime




Total airtime: -156h16m28s; TVM (public): 75h15m26s; Sucesso TV (private): 37h42m59s; STV-SOICO (private): 14h03m50s; Miramar TV (private): 19h14m13s

Created with Datawrapper

TVM (public TV) - Total time allocated per presidential candidate

10 September - 6 October




Total time allocated to presidential candidates: 37h20m23s (all formats)

Created with Datawrapper

The tone of the news coverage on *Televisão de Moçambique* was predominantly neutral. The exception was President Filipe Nyusi, with 53 per cent of the time allocated to him in a “positive” tone. It should be noted that Mozambican public television offered citizens daily reports on the campaign activities of the different candidates. However, no opinion or debate programmes were broadcast, which limited the information offered to voters and their ability to make an informed choice.

Private TV Channels - News coverage (total airtime)

10 Setembro- 6 de Outubro 2024, 18:00-24:00




Base - Sucesso TV: 20h25m55s; STV-SOICO TV: 11h37m27s; Miramar TV: 10h44m:13s
 Outros: (que obtiveram menos de um por cento por canal) PEC-MT, RD, PDM, AMUSI, PARENA, PUN, ADEMO, PARESO, PANAOCC).

Created with Datawrapper

The “tone” of the news coverage on the private channels was predominantly “neutral”. The exception was STV-SOICO TV, which allocated 14 per cent of its time to the government in a “negative” tone and 19 per cent to President Filipe Nyusi. On *Sucesso* TV, 17 per cent of the time was allocated to the government in a “negative” tone, 27 per cent to FRELIMO in a “positive” tone, and 14 per cent in an equally “positive” tone to President Filipe Nyusi.

Private TV Channels - Editorial Coverage (Total airtime)

10 September - 6 de October 2024, 18:00-24:00




Base: STV-SOICO TV: 01h15m59s; Miramar TV: 07h08m19s; Sucesso TV: 13h31m09s Others: (Sum of all those who obtained less than 1% each, by TV channel) PEMO, PDD, MRM, ADEMO, PAREDE, PLD Note: includes election debates broadcast exclusively by Miramar TV and Sucesso TV. It should be noted that TVM (public television) did not show editorial programmes or debates

Created with Datawrapper

Miramar TV (private) TONE of Editorial Coverage (Total airtime)

10 September - 6 de October 2024, 18:00-24:00



Base: Miramar TV: 07h08m19s Note: includes election debates broadcast exclusively by Miramar TV and Sucesso TV. It should be noted that TVM (public television) did not show editorial programmes or debates

Created with Datawrapper

STV-SOICO (private) TONE of Editorial Coverage (Total airtime)

10 September - 6 de October 2024, 18:00-24:00




Base: Miramar TV: 01h15m59s Note: includes election debates broadcast exclusively by Miramar TV and Sucesso TV. The airing time of these programs should also be noted.

Created with Datawrapper

**Sucesso TV (private) TONE of Editorial Coverage (Total
 airtime)**


10 September - 6 de October 2024, 18:00-24:00



Base: Miramar TV: 13h31m09s Note: includes election debates broadcast exclusively by Miramar TV and Sucesso TV.
 Created with Datawrapper

Private TVs - Total time allocated per presidential candidate

10 September - 6 October




Total time allocated to presidential candidates: 35h09m57s (all formats)
 Created with Datawrapper

All TV channels - Political Advertising

10 September - 6 de October 2024, 18:00-24:00

Sucesso TV TVM - Televisão de Moçambique Miramar TV STV - SOICO TV



Base -TVM (pública): 01h12m34s Miramar TV: 01h01m46s; STV-SOICO TV: 00h:57m26s; Sucesso TV: 02h00m53s. Political advertising was exclusive to presidential candidate Daniel Chapo. No other political party bought advertising space.

Created with Datawrapper

TVM (public) - Time allocation by gender

10 September - 6 de October 2024, 18:00-24:00



Total airtime: 74h46m30s Including advertisement and free airtime "Tempo de Antena" Note: Except "Not identifiable" gender

Created with Datawrapper

TVM (public TV) - Time allocation by gender (type of speech)

10 September - 6 de October 2024, 18:00-24:00 Including advertisement and free airtime "Tempo de Antena"




Total airtime: 74hm46s;30 Direct speech: 36h19m02s; Indirect speech: 38h27m28s Note: Except "Not identifiable" gender

Created with Datawrapper

Privat TVs - Time allocation by gender

10 September - 6 October 2024, 18:00-24:00 Including advertisement and free airtime "Tempo de Antena"




Total airtime - Miramar TV: 19h14m:13s; STV-SOICO: 14h03m50s; Sucesso TV: 37h42m59s Nota: Except "Not identifiable" gender.

Created with Datawrapper

Privat TVs - Time allocation by gender (type of speech)

10 September - 6 de October 2024, 18:00-24:00 Including advertisement and free airtime "Tempo de Antena"




Total airtime: 71h01m02s; Indirect speech: 35h01m09s; Direct Speech: 35h59m53s Note: Except "Not identifiable" gender

Created with Datawrapper

GENERAL ELECTIONS – RADIO

RÁDIO DE MOÇAMBIQUE (public radio) - Total time allocated to Presidential Candidates


10 September - 6 October



Total time allocated to presidential candidates: 04h30m25s (all formats)

Created with Datawrapper

Public Rádio de Moçambique - Political and Electoral Coverage by Format - TV




Slot monitored: 6h/10h from 10 September to 6 October 2024 (13h47m08s)

Created with Datawrapper

It should be noted that *Rádio de Moçambique* (public) offered citizens daily reports on the campaign activities of the different candidates. However, no opinion or debate programmes were broadcast, which limited the information offered to voters and their ability to make an informed choice.


**RÁDIO MOÇAMBIQUE (Public radio) - NEWS COVERAGE
(Total airtime)**



Slot time monitored: 6h/10h from 10 September to 6 October (12h35m50s)
Criado com Datawrapper

The “tone” of the news coverage on *Rádio de Moçambique* was predominantly neutral. The exceptions were the “Electoral Administration”, which received a “positive” tone in 16 per cent of the time allocated to it, the Government, with 89 per cent of the references in a “positive” tone, Renamo, in the same “tone” in 33 per cent of the references and, most prominently, President Filipe Nyusi, with all the references made to him in a “positive” tone.


**Public RÁDIO DE MOÇAMBIQUE - Time allocation in
"Rescaldo da Campanha eleitoral"**



Time slot monitored: 6h/10h from 10 September to 6 October (04h16m:45s) Others: (PAHUMO, AMUSI, ND, PVM, PND, MONARUMO, ACRIAJUDA, PANAOC, PARENA, PDD, PLD, RD, PJDM, PT, CDU, PEMO, UM, PDM, PASOMO, PPPM, ADEMO)
Created with Datawrapper

The “tone” of the references to the various actors was predominantly neutral in the time allocated to them in the “Aftermath of the Election Campaign” programme.

Public RÁDIO DE MOÇAMBIQUE - Space allocation by gender (total time)




Total time Monitored: 6h/10h from 10 de September to 6 de October 2024 (13h47m08s)
 Created with Datawrapper

GENERAL ELECTIONS - PRESS

Newspapers - News coverage

10 September - 06 October 2024




Space measured (News, report, interviews, photos): Domingo (weekly): 16.772; Canal de Moçambique (weekly): 9.610; Diário de Moçambique (daily): 43.547; Notícias (daily): 126.848; Savana (weekly): 9.087 cm2 Others: ND, PEC-MT, AMUSI, MONARUMO, MPD, PAHUMO, PANAOC, PARESO, PDM, PEMO, PLD, PND, PT, PUN, RD, UNAMO
Created with Datawrapper

The “tone” of the news coverage in the newspapers that make up the sample is predominantly “neutral”. The following exceptions stand out: Weekly *Domingo* with 16 per cent of the space allocated to President Filipe Nyusi in a “positive” “tone”; weekly *Canal de Moçambique*, with 92.4 per cent of the space allocated to FRELIMO in a “negative” “tone”, and, in the same “tone”, 22.7 per cent to the government, which also had 19.8 per cent of the references in a “positive” “tone”. Finally, 11.3 per cent of the references to President Filipe Nyusi were in a “negative” tone; the daily *Notícias* registered 12 per cent of positive references in the space allocated to the President of the Republic; finally, the weekly *Savana* registered 20 per cent of references to President Filipe Nyusi in the space allocated to him.

Newspapers - Spacetime allocated per presidential candidate


10 September - 6 October



Total space allocated to presidential candidates: 114.196 cm2 (all formats)
Created with Datawrapper

Newspapers - Editorial coverage

10 September - 06 October 2024



Space measured (Letters from readers, cartoon, editorial): Domingo (weekly): 3; Canal de Moçambique (weekly): 5.486; Diário de Moçambique (daily): 111; Savana (weekly) : 2.089 cm2

Created with Datawrapper

The number of editorial pieces is very small in all publications and the “tone” is very similar to that found in the news. It is noteworthy the absence of editorial pieces in the newspaper *Notícias* (whose largest shareholder is the State), similar to what was found with public TV and radio. The weekly *Savana*, known for its critical positions, was one of those that allocated a reporter to Daniel Chapo's entourage during the campaign and throughout the country.

Only FRELIMO used paid advertising space and only in the newspaper *Diário de Moçambique*.

All Newspapers - Electoral coverage by gender

10 September-06 October 2024



Total space measured: 218.363 cm2 - Domingo (weekly); Canal de Moçambique (weekly); Diário de Moçambique (daily); Notícias (daily); Savana (weekly)

Created with Datawrapper

ANNEX 3 – SOCIAL MEDIA MONITORING FINDINGS

The EU EOM established a social media monitoring unit to assess the content and impact of online communication on social networks during the electoral campaign period. From 24 August to 8 October 2024, the monitoring unit analysed an extensive sample of the information published on the main social media used in Mozambique: Facebook, TikTok, Instagram and X. The selection of social media accounts monitored was made according to multiple analytical purposes, and included:

- The four presidential candidates.
- Seven provincial candidates.
- Eight political parties.
- Accounts of 10 opinion leaders in the social media with different political orientation in the social media.
- CNE and STAE.
- Eight national and international media.
- Civil society organization CIP.
- Random pages disseminating false or misleading information.
- Main election-related hashtags.

Social media data was collected using both manual and automated techniques through social listening and monitoring tool SentiOne. The data was pre-processed and prioritised for further review by a team of monitors who collated it and analysed it, both quantitatively and qualitatively.

Digital Environment

The use of Internet and social media in Mozambique is limited. The most recent studies on the subject, dated January 2024, set the Internet penetration rate in the country at 23.2 per cent, meaning that 26.4 million people in Mozambique remain offline¹⁶⁸. Despite this, social media has been vital for the visibility of opposition actors and citizens with limited access to traditional media.

¹⁶⁸ [Digital 2024: Mozambique – DataReportal – Global Digital Insights](#)


Chart 1

Internet access and social media users



Men are the majority users of Facebook, LinkedIn, Instagram and X, whereas women users dominate on TikTok.

Chart 2



All four presidential candidates were present in the social media, with Facebook as the prevalent platform for campaigning. Mondlane and Chapo were by far the most active candidates in the social media, monopolising 86 per cent of all presidential candidates posts in Facebook, Instagram, TikTok and X during the entire campaign period.

Chart 3




Chart 4

Total of posts by candidate



Both Chapo and Mondlane registered a significant increase of followers in their social media accounts during the campaign period. Chapo obtained the highest percentage of increase (183 per cent) in TikTok and Mondlane registered the highest number of new followers (52,000) in Facebook.

Chart 5


	PARTY	PLATFORM	NUMBER OF FOLLOWERS			PERCENTAGE
			24/07/2024	09/10/2024	INCREASE	INCREASE
 Daniel Chapo		Facebook	143,000	163,311	20,311	14%
		Instagram	54,000	58,600	4,600	8.5%
		TikTok	23,200	65,600	42,400	183%
		X	747	876	129	17%
 Venâncio Mondlane	INDEPENDENT 	Facebook	420,000	472,000	52,000	12%
		Instagram	30,100	31,800	1,700	6%
		TikTok	29,900	31,700	1,800	6%
		X	20	29	9	45%
 Ossufo Momade	RENAMO 	Facebook	78,000	79,079	1,079	1%
		Instagram	144	159	15	10%
		TikTok	-	-	-	-
		X	254	267	13	5%
 Lutero Simango		Facebook	4,900	4,900	0	0%
		Instagram	93	102	9	10%
		TikTok	-	-	-	-
		X	10	13	3	30%

Venâncio Mondlane was the presidential candidate with highest engagement (1.5 million interactions) combining the four platforms analysed (Facebook, Instagram, TikTok and X). Daniel Chapo generated half of the interactions than Mondlane (737,587), while Ossufo Momade and Lutero Simango registered 73,623 and 60,708 interactions respectively.

Chart 6


Total interactions by candidates

■ FACEBOOK
 ■ INSTAGRAM
 ■ TIKTOK
 ■ X



Created with Datawrapper

Chart 7



Created with Datawrapper

Disinformation was present during the campaign and the post-election periods. The EU EOM detected several instances of fake news circulating in the social media targeting Ossufo Momade, Venâncio Mondlane and the CNE. The EU EOM was also target of disinformation messages.



